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GOVERNMENTS CAN CHALLENGE CONFEDERATE 
“STATUE STATUTES” 
Zachary Bray* 
ABSTRACT 
Monuments to the Confederacy and former Confederate figures have been 
prominently displayed in parks, courthouse squares, and other public spaces of 
many American towns and cities for many years. Their history is inextricably 
linked with patterns of institutionalized racism, including but not limited to the rise 
of Jim Crow and resistance to the integration of public schools. In recent years, the 
continued display of these monuments has given rise to intense controversy and 
outbreaks of violence. In response, some local governments have sought to remove 
or modify Confederate monuments in public spaces, but in several states, local 
governments face statutory restraints on removing or modifying these monuments. 
More specifically, some local governments must reckon with statutes designed to 
preserve the public display of these monuments in places of honor and respect. 
These “statue statutes” are frequently described as “impossible” barriers for local 
governments that wish to modify or remove Confederate monuments. 
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This Article argues that the conventional wisdom about the statue statutes is 
wrong. Contrary to their reputation, these statutes are so poorly drafted that many 
local governments could remove or modify Confederate monuments in public 
spaces, should they wish to do so. Although the statue statutes will prove less 
effective than many have supposed, it would be best to get rid of them altogether. 
This Article begins by explaining why this should be done: it reviews the myriad 
arguments in favor of repealing the statue statutes or striking them down as 
unconstitutional. But the process of rooting out the statue statutes altogether will 
take time—perhaps a great deal of time—and the prospects of success, at least in 
the short term, are uncertain at best. 
In the meantime, local governments that wish to tear down Confederate 
monuments must figure out how to do so within the statutes’ constraints. This 
Article explains how this can be done: it shows that the protections that the statue 
statutes ostensibly afford Confederate monuments in public spaces are far weaker 
than many suppose. As this Article shows, local governments in many jurisdictions 
with statue statutes have far more freedom to move, modify, or get rid of 
Confederate monuments in public spaces than many have supposed. This Article 
concludes by explaining why arguments for the present frailty of many statue 
statutes complement arguments for their abolition. Those who wish to get rid of 
statue statutes and move, modify, or get rid of the monuments the statutes protect 
should take what actions they can under the existing statutes even as they work to 
get rid of the statutes altogether. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For more than a century, a Confederate monument dedicated to the “rank 
and file of the Armies of the South” stood in Louisville, Kentucky.1 Over seventy 
feet tall and weighing over one hundred tons, the imposing monument was built 
with private funds in 18952—three decades after the end of the Civil War, three 
years after Kentucky enacted a separate coach law that brought Kentucky’s Jim 
Crow regime in line with other southern states,3 and one year before the 
Supreme Court decided Plessy v. Ferguson.4 The monument was originally 
placed in front of a reform school on the city’s outskirts, where it remained for 
its first six decades of existence.5 
In 1954, the year that the Supreme Court decided Brown v. Board of 
Education,6 the monument was moved to a more central location, nearly 
adjacent to the University of Louisville.7 There it remained for several more 
decades.8 In April 2016, just over ten months after a white supremacist and 
Confederate memorabilia enthusiast committed the Charleston church 
massacre,9 Louisville’s mayor and the university’s president announced plans to 
 
 1. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Ky. Div. v. Louisville Jefferson Cty. Metro Gov’t, No. 16-CI-
2009, slip op. at 1 (Ky. Cir. Ct. June 16, 2016). 
 2. Chico Harlan, A 121-Year-Old Confederate Monument Was Coming Down. This Kentucky 
Town Put It Back Up., WASH. POST (Aug. 20, 2017), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/a-121-
year-old-confederate-monument-was-coming-down-this-kentucky-town-put-it-back-up/2017/08/20/7a3
97fc6-85b0-11e7-a50f-e0d4e6ec070a_story.html [http://perma.cc/YU4P-F46U]. 
 3. Anne E. Marshall, Kentucky’s Separate Coach Law and African American Response, 1892–
1900, 98 REG. KY. HIST. SOC’Y 241, 241–42 (2000). 
 4. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 5. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Ky. Div., slip op. at 1. 
 6. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 7. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Ky. Div., slip op. at 1. 
 8. Id. 
 9. In June 2015 nine people were killed during evening Bible study at the Emanuel African 
Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina, by a gunman who repeatedly expressed 
enthusiasm for Confederate memorabilia on social media. Nick Corasaniti et al., Church Massacre 
Suspect Held as Charleston Grieves, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2015), http://nyti.ms/1MNwpAr 
[http://perma.cc/YWP4-279Y]. The Charleston massacre sparked a near-immediate backlash against 
the continued display of Confederate images in public places in South Carolina and elsewhere, 
followed by a groundswell of reactive support for Confederate images in public places. Compare, e.g., 
Ben Brumfield & Catherine E. Shoichet, Protesters To Chant ‘Take It Down’ as S.C. Legislators Meet 
over Flag, CNN (June 23, 2015, 3:32 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/23/us/charleston-church-
shooting-main/index.html [http://perma.cc/HP4N-M4UT] (“[L]ess than a week after the massacre of 
innocents in a Charleston church by a man who venerates the [Confederate] flag, voices from all parts 
of the political spectrum are rising . . . to say the flag must no longer fly over public buildings.”), with, 
e.g., Mason Adams, How the Rebel Flag Rose Again—And Is Helping Trump, POLITICO (June 16, 
2016), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/06/2016-donald-trump-south-confederate-flag-
racism-charleston-shooting-213954 [http://perma.cc/F4LH-RHJ5] (noting that over 360 Confederate 
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relocate the monument to an unspecified alternative location.10 According to 
Louisville’s mayor, moving the monument had become necessary because it no 
longer had a “place in a compassionate, forward leaning city.”11 
In May 2016, concerned that the monument would be moved to a less 
prominent site or destroyed, the Kentucky Division of the Sons of Confederate 
Veterans filed suit to stop its removal.12 The plaintiffs based their arguments, in 
part,13 on a Kentucky statute that prohibits the alteration, destruction, or 
removal of “military heritage site[s],”14 which expressly include monuments to 
“activities engaged in by the Confederate States of America.”15 Although the 
court granted the plaintiffs a temporary restraining order, it ultimately concluded 
that the statute did not protect the monument from removal.16 In June 2016 the 
court granted the City of Louisville’s motion to dismiss the suit.17 The monument 
was moved to neighboring Brandenburg, a small town in a nearby county that 
periodically hosts Civil War reenactments of a Confederate general’s raids across 
the Ohio River.18 Brandenburg’s elected officials were eager to take the 
monument, as were many (but not all) of Brandenburg’s residents.19 At the 
monument’s festive rededication ceremony in its new home, hundreds of happy 
local citizens and monument supporters outnumbered roughly a dozen 
protesters.20 
The story of this monument—once Louisville’s and now Brandenburg’s—is 
typical, in many ways, of the history of and recent conflicts over Confederate 
monuments in this country. Like the Louisville monument, in recent years many 
monuments to the Confederacy or famous Confederates have been altered or 
removed from public places where they once stood in former Confederate 
states,21 former border states,22 and states with little apparent connection to the 
 
flag rallies occurred around the South in the six months after the Charleston shooting). 
 10. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Ky. Div., slip op. at 1. The University of Louisville was 
involved because of its proximity to the monument and because it planned to cover the cost of the 
monument’s removal with private funds given to a university foundation. Id. at 2. 
 11. Harlan, supra note 2. 
 12. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Ky. Div., slip op. at 2. 
 13. Id. at 5. 
 14. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 171.788(1) (West 2018). 
 15. Id. § 171.780(2). 
 16. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Ky. Div., slip op. at 7. 
 17. Id. at 2, 7–8. 
 18. Meade County Civil War Heritage Ass’n, BRANDENBURG CIVIL WAR REENACTMENT, 
http://www.brandenburgreenactment.com/ [http://perma.cc/ZHM2-W9S4] (last visited Nov. 1, 2018). 
 19. Jonah Engel Bromwich, Confederate Monument, Shunned by One Kentucky City, Is 
Welcomed in Another, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2017), http://nyti.ms/2siFRHU [http://perma.cc/3WMM-
6AJK]. 
 20. Harlan, supra note 2. 
 21. E.g., Christopher Mele, New Orleans Begins Removing Confederate Monuments, Under 
Police Guard, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2017), http://nyti.ms/2pdsxqd [http://perma.cc/3ZZH-39QW]. 
 22. E.g., Toriano Porter & Joe Robertson, Vandalized Confederate Monument in KC Is Boxed 
Up Ahead of Removal, KAN. CITY STAR (Aug. 20, 2017, 5:23 PM), http://www.kansascity.com/news/
local/article168249392.html [http://perma.cc/WK6G-V4WF]. 
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Confederacy.23 Some of these removals occurred after significant and prolonged 
debate that attracted national attention,24 while other monuments were bundled 
away quickly and quietly with relatively little conflict over their removal or 
ultimate destination.25 But like the Brandenburg monument, many other 
monuments to the Confederacy or famous Confederates remain in public places, 
even when they have provided a focus for tragic violence that has transfixed the 
country.26 
Despite this legacy of institutionalized discrimination and violence, support 
for retaining Confederate monuments in public spaces remains high, especially in 
those states where the bulk of the monuments are located.27 In many recent 
regional and national polls, at least a plurality of respondents favor preserving 
Confederate monuments in public spaces,28 although in some areas local 
majorities are strongly against Confederate monument preservation.29 More 
specifically, in university towns and relatively large and diverse urban areas, such 
as Louisville, opposition to Confederate monuments tends to be relatively 
strong, and local officials are often willing to take action to remove or alter 
 
 23. See, e.g., Angela Brandt, City of Helena To Remove Confederate Fountain, HELENA INDEP. 
REC. (Aug. 16, 2017), http://helenair.com/news/local/city-of-helena-to-remove-confederate-
fountain/article_606b058a-4e09-5802-a7b8-dc07f2b0a27e.html [http://perma.cc/88ME-Q9AD]. 
 24. See, e.g., Jelani Cobb, The Battle over Confederate Monuments in New Orleans, NEW 
YORKER (May 12, 2017), http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-battle-over-
confederate-monuments-in-new-orleans [http://perma.cc/925E-UGG8]. 
 25. See, e.g., Colin Campbell & Luke Broadwater, Citing ‘Safety and Security,’ Pugh Has 
Baltimore Confederate Monuments Taken Down, BALT. SUN (Aug. 16, 2017, 5:20 PM), 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-ci-monuments-removed-20170816-
story.html [http://perma.cc/B9TB-6ZPF] (“We moved quickly and quietly . . . . There was enough 
grandstanding, enough speeches being made.” (quoting Baltimore Mayor Catherine Pugh)). 
 26. See, e.g., Paul Duggan, Charlottesville Judge Orders Shrouds Removed from Confederate 
Statues, WASH. POST (Feb. 27, 2018), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/charlottesville-
judge-orders-shrouds-removed-from-confederate-statues/2018/02/27/3592ae10-1bf6-11e8-9de1-147dd
2df3829_story.html [http://perma.cc/Z8GE-V76B]. 
 27. E.g., Early Exit Polls: Virginia Voters Favor Keeping Confederate Monuments, NBC NEWS 
(Nov. 7, 2017, 5:45 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/card/nbc-news-early-exit-polls-virginia-voters-favor-
keeping-confederate-n818641 [http://perma.cc/PDP5-HGM2]; Alex Seitz-Wald, NBC News Poll: The 
South, Once a Conservative Bastion, Is Changing, NBC NEWS (Apr. 12, 2018, 2:39 AM), http://www
.nbcnews.com/politics/elections/nbc-news-poll-south-once-conservative-bastion-changing-n864441 
[http://perma.cc/F7MN-U9VR] (“[A] strong majority of Southerners—61 percent—oppose removing 
Confederate monuments and statues from public spaces, while just 36 percent support their 
removal.”). 
 28. E.g., Chris Kahn, A Majority of Americans Want To Preserve Confederate Monuments: 
Reuters/Ipsos Poll, REUTERS (Aug. 21, 2017, 5:51 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-protests-
poll/a-majority-of-americans-want-to-preserve-confederate-monuments-reuters-ipsos-poll-idU
SKCN1B12EG [http://perma.cc/CE4Z-CZFZ]. 
 29. See, e.g., Antonio Olivo, After Charlottesville, Va. Democrats See Chance To Change 114-
Year-Old Monuments Law, WASH. POST (Aug. 25, 2017), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-
politics/after-charlottesville-va-democrats-see-opening-to-change-114-year-old-monuments-law/2017/
08/25/5e97e766-880e-11e7-a94f-3139abce39f5_story.html [http://perma.cc/EAR3-SKFM] (noting that 
in Virginia most cities are relatively diverse and liberal politically, while the populations of rural and 
exurban areas, and the state government as a whole, tend to be more conservative and solicitous of the 
state’s Confederate past). 
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them.30 On the other hand, in rural, exurban, and some suburban areas, such as 
Brandenburg, support for Confederate monuments tends to be relatively high, 
both among the general public and local officials.31 
This pronounced split in opinions on Confederate monuments can be 
understood, in part, as an example of a wider and widening rural-urban divide. 
This rural-urban split is partly cultural, as Americans on either side of it 
increasingly feel estranged from their fellow citizens.32 But it is also structural, 
because local governments are and historically have been systematically 
disadvantaged by the American federal framework.33 
In the case of debates over Confederate monuments in public places, it is 
easy for the cultural and structural issues behind the wider rural-urban divide to 
boil over, because the resolution of these debates often appears to be 
particularly arbitrary for the losing side.34 In general, those who disagree with 
preservation decisions often find them to be arbitrary because the preservation 
of physical objects and spaces frequently depends on relatively open-ended and 
elastic values.35 Preservation decisions in prominent public spaces are even more 
likely to be arbitrary when, as with the preservation of Confederate monuments, 
they relate to historical narratives that marginalize minority communities.36 
 
 30. See, e.g., Mitch Landrieu, Mayor, New Orleans, Address at Gallier Hall (May 19, 2017), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t0jQTHis3f4 [http://perma.cc/U8M5-BMSH] (transcript available at 
http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2017/05/mayor_landrieu_speech_confeder.html 
[http://perma.cc/FZ46-APP6]) (noting, in a speech celebrating the removal of monuments to the “Lost 
Cause of the Confederacy,” the “searing truth” that the removed monuments were as much a part of 
post-Reconstruction racial terrorism “as a burning cross on someone’s lawn”). 
 31. See, e.g., Seth McLaughlin, Confederate Heritage Stands Strong in Parts of Rural Virginia, 
WASH. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2017), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/oct/15/confederate-statues-
still-stand-in-rural-virginia/ [http://perma.cc/HT5G-9V4T] (quoting Joyce Kistner, the chair of the 
Bristol, Virginia, chapter of the United Daughters of the Confederacy, who noted that the chapter has 
“had the support of the community from the beginning” and that “[e]verybody has appreciated [the 
local Confederate monument]”). 
 32. See, e.g., Jose A. DelReal & Scott Clement, Rural Divide, WASH. POST (June 17, 2017), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/national/rural-america/ [http://perma.cc/PZ76-LS5T] 
(exploring the results of a Washington Post-Kaiser Family Foundation survey finding a growing sense 
of estrangement held by those living in rural areas from people who live in urban areas); see also KIM 
PARKER ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., WHAT UNITES AND DIVIDES URBAN, SUBURBAN AND RURAL 
COMMUNITIES 41 (2018) (finding that majorities of both urban and rural Americans “say people who 
don’t live in their type of community have a very or somewhat negative view of those who do”). 
 33. See, e.g., Richard C. Schragger, The Attack on American Cities, 96 TEX. L. REV. 1163, 1167 
(2018) [hereinafter Schragger, American Cities] (analyzing the enduring nature of anti-urbanism in 
American federalism, and arguing that this “structural anti-urbanism reflects and reinforces the 
widening political gap between American cities and other parts of the country”). 
 34. See Carol M. Rose, Preservation and Community: New Directions in the Law of Historic 
Preservation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 473, 476–77 (1981). 
 35. See id. 
 36. Stephen Clowney, Landscape Fairness: Removing Discrimination from the Built 
Environment, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 1, 3 (noting that public places often enshrine “selective and 
misleading versions of the past in solid, material forms,” which can “marginalize certain 
communities—particularly African American communities—and transmit ideas about racial power 
across generations”). 
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Similarly, decisions about the preservation and presentation of historic sites or 
figures are likely to reflect both past and contemporary perspectives about status 
and political power in ways that may seem to disenfranchise those disappointed 
with the preservation decision.37 Accordingly, disputes about Confederate 
monuments in public places have been and are likely to remain bitterly 
contentious: these disputes tend to concentrate the worst aspects of debates 
about preservation even as they provide a natural focus for our widening rural-
urban divide. 
In some states, legal issues about the relative power of state and local 
authorities have combined with the underlying causes of the recent monument 
disputes in a particularly toxic way.38 More specifically, many of the most intense 
conflicts have taken place in states with statutes that restrict the ability of local 
communities to alter monuments to the Confederacy in public places. Indeed, 
one such statute was involved in the lawsuit over the Louisville-Brandenburg 
monument.39 In contrast, many local governments in states without such statutes 
have disposed of or altered high-profile Confederate monuments in relatively 
short order.40 Following Richard Schragger’s recent work on the invasion of 
Charlottesville by white supremacists, this Article refers to these state controls 
over Confederate monuments as “statue statutes.”41 
Many of these statue statutes are relatively recent, though some date back a 
decade or more, and the earliest version of one such statute dates back over a 
century.42 Regardless of their age, none of the statue statutes faced significant 
 
 37. J. Peter Byrne, Hallowed Ground: The Gettysburg Battlefield in Historic Preservation Law, 
22 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 203, 206, 268 (2009) (“Decisions about preservation and presentation of a historic 
site . . . will always reflect the perspectives of contemporary society, especially those with power.”). 
 38. The states in question are Virginia, Tennessee, Alabama, Georgia, North Carolina, 
Mississippi, Kentucky, and South Carolina. 
 39. See supra notes 10–20 and accompanying text for a discussion of the monument’s removal. 
 40. Compare, e.g., John Sharp, How Alabama Could Become ‘Ground Zero’ in Renewed Battle 
over Confederate Symbols, AL.COM (Apr. 22, 2018), http://www.al.com/news/index.ssf/2018/04/
confederate_monuments_battle.html [http://perma.cc/4DRD-4WQY] (describing the connection 
between Alabama’s very recent statue statute and the intense conflicts over Confederate monuments 
around the state), and Benjamin Wallace-Wells, The Fight over Virginia’s Confederate Monuments, 
NEW YORKER (Dec. 4, 2017), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/12/04/the-fight-over-
virginias-confederate-monuments [http://perma.cc/9ZR2-LC3U] (describing the protracted conflict, 
violence, and death surrounding Confederate monuments in Virginia, the state with the oldest statue 
statute), with, e.g., Campbell & Broadwater, supra note 25 (describing the 2017 removal of high-profile 
Confederate monuments in Baltimore, Maryland, a state without a statue statute), and Mele, supra 
note 21 (describing the 2017 removal of high-profile Confederate monuments in New Orleans, 
Louisiana, a state without a statue statute). 
 41. See Richard C. Schragger, When White Supremacists Invade a City, 104 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 
58, 63 (2018) [hereinafter Schragger, When White Supremacists Invade] (referring briefly to Virginia’s 
“statue statute” in the context of a discussion about the lack of legal authority available to local 
governments faced with armed aggressors). 
 42. For more detail on the history of various statue statutes, see infra Section II. Many of the 
relatively recent statue statutes are sometimes titled and referred to by some commentators as 
“Heritage Protection Acts,” because versions of that phrase pop up in the acts’ titles for some of the 
statue statutes passed in the last decade or so. E.g., Alfred Brophy, Wahlers on NC Monument 
Protection Act, FAC. LOUNGE (Nov. 28, 2015, 11:38 AM), http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2015/11/
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controversy until roughly 2015, when many communities began to reconsider the 
public display of Confederate flags and monuments after the Charleston church 
massacre.43 All of the statue statutes seek to strip authority away from local 
governments that might wish to remove or alter monuments on their own 
authority,44 and in so doing they fire the rural-urban divide that provides so 
much of the fuel for the underlying conflicts.45 
Because many of the conflicts over Confederate monuments are relatively 
recent, the statue statutes that help exacerbate some of the worst monument 
conflicts have not received the attention they deserve. Moreover, much of the 
ink that has been spilled on these statutes tends to focus not on the merit of their 
underlying purpose, or lack thereof, but rather on their alleged strength. In other 
words, it is frequently said or written that the statue statutes make it terribly 
difficult, or even impossible, for local governments to move or modify 
Confederate monuments in public places.46 But, as one scholar has already noted 
 
wahlers-on-nc-monument-protection-act.html [http://perma.cc/46L5-W4FR]. This Article will refer to 
all such restrictions as “statue statutes,” since the original versions of some of the statutes considered 
here are years older—or, in Virginia’s case, over a century older—than the relatively recent Heritage 
Protection Acts. 
 43. See, e.g., Olivo, supra note 29 (noting that Virginia’s statue statute “went largely 
unchallenged” from 1904 “until a 2015 legal dispute in Danville,” was sparked “over the removal of a 
Confederate flag”). 
 44. See id. 
 45. See David A. Graham, Local Officials Want To Remove Confederate Monuments—But 
States Won’t Let Them, ATLANTIC (Aug. 25, 2017), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/
08/when-local-officials-want-to-tear-down-confederate-monuments-but-cant/537351/ 
[http://perma.cc/959V-EKPC] (noting that a statue statute imposed by the state legislature “can 
prevent [local] officials . . . from removing Confederate monuments, but it is unlikely to change minds 
of left-leaning electorates in cities like Chapel Hill and Birmingham”). 
 46. Examples abound of government officials, state legislators, lawyers, and reporters who 
emphasize the perceived strength of statue statutes and the difficulty that local governments have 
faced and will face if they attempt to remove monuments protected by these statutes. E.g., Jackson 
Baker, Author of Heritage Protection Act Cautions City About ‘Consequences’, MEMPHIS FLYER (Sept. 
7, 2017, 12:16 PM), http://www.memphisflyer.com/JacksonBaker/archives/2017/09/06/author-of-
heritage-protection-act-cautions-city-about-consequences [http://perma.cc/EY2D-F7LV] (quoting the 
author of Tennessee’s statue statute, who threatened dire consequences for the Memphis City Council 
should it remove certain Confederate monuments); Jeffrey C. Billman, The Mayor of New Orleans 
Explains Why North Carolina’s Monuments to White Supremacy Need To Come Down, INDY WEEK 
(Durham, N.C.) (May 23, 2017, 3:46 PM), http://www.indyweek.com/editor/archives/2017/05/23/the-
mayor-of-new-orleans-explains-why-north-carolinas-monuments-to-white-supremacy-need-to-come-
down [http://perma.cc/S77Y-2KHW] (noting that North Carolina’s statue statute makes “it nearly 
impossible” to alter or remove Confederate monuments “from public spaces”); Jessica Bliss & Holly 
Meyer, In the South, Confederate Monuments Often Protected, Hard To Remove Thanks to State Laws, 
TENNESSEAN (Aug. 17, 2017, 6:00 AM), http://www.tennessean.com/story/news/2017/08/17/south-
confederate-monuments-often-protected-hard-remove-state-laws/573226001 [http://perma.cc/WEQ3-
XBZ2] (noting that statue statutes prevent Confederate monuments “from being taken down or 
altered without great difficulty”); Graham, supra note 45 (noting that “[a]cross the South, citizens are 
rising up and demanding that their towns and cities remove Confederate monuments,” while in those 
cities located in states with statue statutes, “local officials are reckoning with the fact that they don’t 
actually have the power to do that”); Josh Magness, There’s a Push To Remove Confederate Statues. In 
Some States, That’s Hard or Illegal, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Aug. 17, 2017, 8:58 AM), 
http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/nation-world/national/article167692922.html [http://perma.cc
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with respect to Virginia’s statue statute,47 and as this Article shows for many of 
the state statue statutes,48 this widely held view about the impenetrability of 
statue statutes is incorrect. 
Until now, the flaws inherent in the statue statutes have been difficult to 
see. The true weaknesses of these statutes have been obscured in part by “arcane 
issues of state law,”49 which, as Section II shows, are time-consuming to unpack 
for several reasons. First, many of the statutes were drafted at different times, 
which means that their structure and language vary widely. This has obscured 
some of the opportunities for local government action under the statue statutes, 
helping to conceal even those opportunities for local action that recur across 
multiple statue statutes. Moreover, most of the challenges to the statutes to date 
have focused on individual statutes as state-specific obstacles to individual local 
government actions. This is understandable, but it tends to obscure some of the 
weaknesses that are common to many of the statutes from different 
jurisdictions—weaknesses explored in the remainder of this Article. Given the 
similarities in the legislative history, text, and structure of many statue statutes, 
local governments that wish to remove ostensibly protected monuments have 
 
/78C4-TGDM] (“Despite the seeming momentum to remove [Confederate monuments], a handful of 
Southern states have laws that make taking down the controversial Confederate monuments 
incredibly challenging—if not impossible.”); Jacob Reynolds, Georgia State Law Makes It Difficult To 
Completely Remove or Hide Confederate Monuments, WMAZ (Aug. 17, 2017, 8:25 AM), 
http://www.13wmaz.com/article/news/local/georgia-state-law-makes-it-difficult-to-completely-remove-
or-hide-confederate-monuments/464932603 [http://perma.cc/TZ83-XMG6] (concluding that Georgia’s 
statue statute “may make it impossible for any cities and counties to completely remove or destroy 
existing Confederate monuments”); Jessica Schladebeck, It’s Illegal for America To Tear Down All of 
Its Confederate Past, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 17, 2017), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/
impossible-america-tear-confederate-article-1.3420524 [http://perma.cc/2PYZ-3UPK] (claiming that 
statue statutes “make it next to impossible for America to tear down all that links it to its Confederate 
past”); Kaeli Subberwal, Several States Have Erected Laws To Protect Confederate Monuments, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 18, 2017, 9:09 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/states-confederate-
statue-laws_us_5996312be4b0e8cc855cb2ab [http://perma.cc/5DGX-AUVE] (noting that a “maze of 
statutes” may make conversations about statue removal “moot” in several states); Dan Whisenhunt, 
Decatur City Leaders Grappling with Calls To Remove Confederate Monument, DECATURISH (Aug. 
15, 2017), http://decaturish.com/2017/08/decatur-city-leaders-grappling-with-calls-to-remove-
confederate-monument [http://perma.cc/4W6R-AV35] (quoting city leaders and state legislators, 
including one state senator who “had forgotten” about Georgia’s statue statute but concluded 
“[o]bviously [legislators] would need to eliminate that before the locals can take action”). 
 47. Rich Schragger, Opinion, Is Charlottesville’s Robert E. Lee Statue Illegal?, RICH. TIMES-
DISPATCH (Aug. 30, 2017) [hereinafter Schragger, Robert E. Lee], 
http://www.richmond.com/opinion/their-opinion/guest-columnists/rich-schragger-column-is-charlottesv
ille-srobert-e-lee-statue/article_888d6495-6176-5cea-9278-71018d293f2a.html [http://perma.cc/2B2Y-
6B3H]. 
 48. See infra Section II. 
 49. Micah Schwartzman & Nelson Tebbe, Charlottesville’s Monuments Are Unconstitutional, 
SLATE (Aug. 25, 2017, 9:07 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/
08/charlottesville_s_monuments_are_unconstitutional.html [http://perma.cc/GHU6-GPGV]. 
Schwartzman and Tebbe pointed out the larger constitutional principles at stake in the Charlottesville 
monument conflict, beyond the “arcane issues of state law” related to Virginia’s statue statute. Id. The 
arguments that Schwartzman and Tebbe raised about the unconstitutionality of statue statutes are 
discussed in detail in Section I, infra. 
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much to gain from greater coordination of challenges across multiple 
jurisdictions.50 
Upon closer inspection, the truth emerges: the protections that statue 
statutes provide for Confederate monuments are far less extensive than many 
have imagined, hoped, or feared.51 Many local governments may be able to move 
their Confederate monuments to less prominent locations, or place monuments 
into a more appropriate and less celebratory context, even if some statue statutes 
survive in something like their current form. Perhaps most importantly, this 
Article may help local governments and sympathetic state officials in different 
jurisdictions coordinate their efforts to exploit the various opportunities for local 
action that are common to multiple statue statutes across different jurisdictions. 
Pointing out the practical weaknesses of the statue statutes should not be 
interpreted as a defense of or an attempt to rehabilitate either the statue statutes 
or the monuments they protect. Writing almost a century and a half ago, 
Frederick Douglass called the first wave of “[m]onuments to the ‘lost cause’” 
that were going up around the former Confederacy “monuments of folly,” which 
could only create a “needless record of stupidity and wrong” and serve “little or 
no purpose” in the future beyond “cultivating hatred.”52 Sections I and II of this 
Article show that Douglass’s criticism also applies to the more recent statue 
statutes enacted to protect these monuments. The execution of the statue 
statutes is frequently shoddy, creating opportunities for local governments to 
move against protected monuments. But the purpose behind these statutes—to 
strip away local control over public spaces and to protect monuments originally 
raised to discrimination and institutionalized violence53—is far worse. 
It would be best, therefore, if state legislatures simply did away with the 
statue statutes altogether, publicly repudiating the statutes themselves and 
affirming the rights of local governments to remove or modify the physical and 
monumental legacies of discrimination and violence that the statutes purport to 
protect. The second-best outcome would be for courts to conclude that the statue 
 
 50. See infra notes 115–116, 125, 156, 180–182, 216–217, 263, 317 and accompanying text for 
examples of the disparate past and pending challenges to the various statue statutes in different states. 
 51. See infra Section II for a review of each state statue statute and the opportunities for local 
government action. 
 52. Monuments of Folly, NEW NAT’L ERA (D.C.), Dec. 1, 1870, at 3. 
 53. For a brief examination of the history and purpose behind many Confederate monuments 
themselves and the inseparable relationship between these monuments and campaigns to impose 
systems of legal discrimination and extrajudicial violence, see supra and infra notes 1–11, 64–70, 76–78 
and accompanying text. 
 The facial language of most statue statutes does not, of course, refer to this history, nor indeed do 
most statue statutes single out the Confederacy or Confederate history. Rather, the statue statutes 
tend to refer to American military history generally, or a long list of military conflicts and/or historical 
periods that include the Civil War and the Confederacy. See infra notes 126–140, 174–176, 197–198, 
218–228, 234–236, 244–245 and accompanying text for examples of this wording. But a close 
examination of the statue statutes’ histories, legislative or otherwise, shows that they were designed 
with a near-exclusive focus on public monuments to the Confederacy and a desire to strip control from 
local governments that might wish to amend or remove such monuments in light of their troubled past 
and present. See infra notes 128, 143, 164–165, 197–198, 220–225 and accompanying text. 
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statutes are unconstitutional, adopting one or more of the arguments reviewed in 
Section I of this Article. Readers can judge for themselves how likely either of 
these outcomes might be in the near future. But as far as the prospect of repeal 
goes, it should be noted that many executive officials, state legislators, and 
academics in states with statue statutes tend to view the prospect of revision as 
unlikely, at least in the next few years.54 It must also be remembered that despite 
intense local opposition in many cities and towns, substantial majorities of the 
American public favor retaining most existing Confederate monuments in public 
spaces—by a ratio of two to one, according to some recent polls55—and the 
margins are even greater in states with large numbers of Confederate 
monuments.56 
As Sections I and III of this Article show, the relevant state legislatures or 
courts may entirely undo most or all of the statue statutes. But unless and until 
this hope is realized, local governments that wish to remove or modify existing 
Confederate monuments must either give up or find a path forward within the 
existing statutes’ constraints. Given the way that statue statutes are usually 
described—as “impossible” obstacles to removing or modifying Confederate 
monuments, “regardless of the desires of local municipalities”57—it would be 
easy for ordinary citizens and elected officials who want to get rid of 
Confederate monuments to grow discouraged or even give up entirely. However, 
as this Article shows, giving up in the face of statue statutes is a mistake. 
Instead of giving up, local governments that wish to modify or get rid of 
Confederate monuments in public places should be encouraged to challenge the 
relevant statue statutes. Many local governments may be able to challenge 
existing statue statutes in a coordinated fashion, exploiting the opportunities for 
local action that are common across multiple jurisdictions and using their 
collective action to alter public opinion in their respective states and around the 
 
 54. E.g., Michael Jones, Petition Seeks Change in Ga. Law that Protects Confederate Monuments, 
WABE (Atlanta) (Aug. 15, 2017), http://www.wabe.org/petition-seeks-change-ga-law-protects-
confederate-monuments [http://perma.cc/435Q-LNJG] (quoting state representatives and academics 
hostile to Georgia’s statue statute who uniformly conclude that amending or abolishing the statute is 
improbable in the next few years); see also Kirk Brown et al., Gov. McMaster Doubts Efforts To 
Remove Confederate Monuments Will Spread to South Carolina, HERALD (Rock Hill, S.C.) (Aug. 14, 
2017, 11:13 PM), http://www.heraldonline.com/latest-news/article167231897.html [http://perma.cc/
4BXU-ECJU] (quoting South Carolina Governor Henry McMaster and South Carolina House of 
Representatives Speaker Jay Lucas, who each ruled out any changes or exceptions to the state’s statue 
statute in the foreseeable future). 
 55. See, e.g., Kahn, supra note 28 (noting that 54% of respondents thought Confederate 
monuments “should remain in all public spaces” while only 27% thought the monuments “should be 
removed from all public spaces”). 
 56. See NPR/PBS NEWSHOUR/MARIST POLL NATIONAL TABLES, “DO YOU THINK STATUES 
HONORING LEADERS OF THE CONFEDERACY SHOULD REMAIN/BE REMOVED” 9 (Aug. 2017) (noting 
that 66% of respondents in the South thought such monuments should remain); see also supra notes 
27–32 and accompanying text (gathering similar polls). 
 57. Melba Newsome, Is Removing Confederate Monuments like Erasing History?, NBC NEWS 
(Apr. 25, 2017, 4:28 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/nbcblk/are-removing-confederate-
monuments-erasing-history-n750526 [http://perma.cc/7R7R-RSJB]; see also supra note 46 (gathering 
numerous similar sources). 
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nation. As this Article shows, when we tug at the seams of the statue statutes, we 
find room for local governments to remove or modify many existing Confederate 
monuments in public spaces even if the statutes remain in place indefinitely. In 
other words, even if this Article’s modest effort does not entirely unstitch the 
statue statutes, it does show that the statutes’ protections for Confederate 
monuments are more threadbare than their defenders imagine and their 
opponents fear. As a result, local governments that wish to remove or modify 
existing Confederate monuments in jurisdictions with statue statutes have more 
options than many have supposed and reported. 
In addition, by pointing out the thin and ragged nature of the protections 
existing statue statutes provide, this Article seeks to encourage state legislators 
to reconsider the existence of statue statutes in jurisdictions where they have 
been enacted and to deter the passage of additional statue statutes where such 
bills have been considered, but not enacted, in recent years.58 Striking the statue 
statutes from the books may take a long time. But because these statutes, at least 
in their current form, leave many avenues open for local governments to remove 
or modify existing monuments, legislators in states that either already have or 
are considering such statutes should ask themselves: What useful purpose, if any, 
does this legislation serve? As this Article shows, when the histories and effects 
of the statue statutes are examined in detail, it is hard to avoid the conclusion 
that—like the monuments they ostensibly protect—these statutes serve little or 
no purpose worth defending, but rather perpetuate a long history of 
institutionalized racism and violence.59 
The remainder of this Article proceeds in three sections. Section I provides 
short histories of Confederate monuments in public spaces and the statue 
statutes that purport to protect these monuments, and a short summary of some 
constitutional arguments advanced by other scholars, which, if adopted, would 
do away with the statue statutes altogether. Section II provides a close and 
critical examination of the various statue statutes themselves and identifies 
opportunities within each state’s statute that some or all local governments might 
exploit to remove or modify at least some Confederate monuments in public 
spaces. Finally, Section III provides arguments against the statue statutes’ 
potential rehabilitation. More specifically, Section III suggests that courts should 
 
 58. For example, in 2017 the Arkansas legislature considered a statue statute, the Arkansas 
Military Heritage Protection Act, which passed the relevant committees in both houses but failed to 
pass the full legislature. To Create the Arkansas Military Heritage Protection Act, H.B. 1297, 91st 
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2017), http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/assembly/2017/2017R/Pages/
BillInformation.aspx?measureno=HB1297 [http://perma.cc/U7FY-T4FC]. To take another example, 
Louisiana’s state legislature has considered multiple statue statutes in recent years, though to date all 
have failed to pass. See Julia O’Donoghue, Confederate Monument Protection Effort Stalls in 
Louisiana Legislature—For Now, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans) (Apr. 14, 2016), 
http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2016/04/confederate_monument_bill_pass.html [http://perma.cc/
R2GK-KLXW]. 
 59. Cf. Monuments of Folly, supra note 52 (arguing that “there [would be] little or no purpose in 
[the] erection” of the earliest Confederate monuments, because the monuments would fail to alter the 
verdict of history upon their subjects and serve only to foster “the keen remembrance of . . . enormous 
wrong[s]” that “they must necessarily perpetuate”). 
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not accept the vague appeals to intrastate preemption that some states have 
already offered in early attempts to close off opportunities for local action under 
the statue statutes. Section III also argues that attempts to repair the broken 
statue statutes by eliminating opportunities for local action should only make the 
statutes more vulnerable to the constitutional challenges outlined in Section I. 
I. BROKEN FROM THE BEGINNING: THE HISTORY AND FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS 
OF CONFEDERATE MONUMENTS AND THE STATUE STATUTES 
Like the Louisville-Brandenburg monument,60 the history of most 
Confederate monuments is intimately and inextricably bound up with campaigns 
of racial intimidation and violence designed to overturn Reconstruction, to 
establish Jim Crow, and to resist integration after Brown v. Board of 
Education.61 Section I begins by briefly reviewing the historical relationship 
between public Confederate monuments and patterns of systematic oppression 
and violence.62 Section I then reviews arguments advanced by others that the 
statue statutes are unconstitutional in light of the messages of oppression and 
violence that many Confederate monuments were designed to reinforce.63 
A. The Troubling History Behind Confederate Monuments and Statue Statutes 
A recent comprehensive survey and report prepared by the Southern 
Poverty Law Center (SPLC) on Confederate monuments across the nation helps 
to illustrate how the dedication of Confederate monuments spiked in two distinct 
periods. The first period, from around 1900 through the 1920s, encompassed the 
enactment of Jim Crow laws and the revival of the Ku Klux Klan as the 
“Invisible Empire.”64 The second period, from the mid-1950s through the late 
1960s, encompassed both the modern civil rights movement and widespread 
 
 60. See supra notes 1–20 and accompanying text. 
 61. See Coleman v. Miller, 885 F. Supp. 1561, 1565 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (noting that in Georgia, 
“expressions of interest in Confederate history” and the erection and defense of Confederate symbols 
and monuments in public places “coalesced with public outcry in reaction to desegregation mandates 
by the Supreme Court”); Clowney, supra note 36, at 10–13 (describing the ways in which Confederate 
monuments cemented post-Reconstruction threats of violence and patterns of racial stratification); 
Sophie Abramowitz et al., Tools of Displacement: How Charlottesville, Virginia’s Confederate Statues 
Helped Decimate the City’s Historically Successful Black Communities, SLATE (June 23, 2017, 3:20 
PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/history/2017/06/how_charlottesville_s_confedera
te_statues_helped_decimate_the_city_s_historically.html [http://perma.cc/MY9U-USEX] (arguing that 
the Charlottesville monuments were built atop land confiscated from prosperous African American 
residents of Charlottesville and subsequently served to mark off “areas of political and financial power 
as part of the ideology of the Lost Cause” of the Confederacy); Mele, supra note 21 (noting that one of 
the four monuments removed by New Orleans expressly commemorated the 1874 “Battle” of Liberty 
Place, honoring members of the Crescent City White League who fought against the then-racially 
integrated New Orleans Police Department). 
 62. See infra Part I.A. 
 63. See infra Part I.B. 
 64. BOOTH GUNTER ET AL., S. POVERTY LAW CTR., WHOSE HERITAGE? PUBLIC SYMBOLS OF 
THE CONFEDERACY 12–15 (2016). 
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resistance to desegregation.65  
The SPLC report details the correlation between the dedication of 
Confederate monuments and periods of intense racial discrimination and 
violence.66 But many other thoughtful observers have long noted the link 
between these monuments and institutionalized discrimination.67 For example, 
during travels through Atlanta and the Carolinas in 1931, W. E. B. Du Bois 
wrote of the unavoidable and mutually reinforcing connection between the sheer 
number of physical monuments to the Confederacy in public spaces—“awful 
things” that should have been dedicated “to the memory of those who fought to 
Perpetuate Human Slavery”—and the similar omnipresence of both “the rules of 
‘Jim-Crow’” and the prevailing “custom of murder.”68 
Notwithstanding this intimate and inextricable connection between 
Confederate monuments in public civic spaces and the nation’s deeply fraught 
history of segregation, intimidation, and violence, the continued presence of 
these monuments in public spaces remains popular.69 Defenders of the continued 
existence of Confederate monuments in public civic spaces offer many 
justifications for the monuments’ preservation. Some contemporary defenders of 
Confederate monuments simply resort to the racially charged threats of violence 
that have been associated with these monuments since their creation.70 Others 
base their arguments on family, personal, or cultural connections with the dead 
Confederates to whom the monuments are dedicated.71 
The most thoughtful defenders of retaining at least some Confederate 
monuments in public spaces tend to deplore what many Confederate monuments 
represent but argue that monument removal or destruction might lead to 
historical amnesia about the history of racial discrimination that they represent.72 
 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. E.g., Monuments of Folly, supra note 52. 
 68. W. E. B. Du Bois, Postscript, 40 CRISIS 278, 279 (1931). 
 69. See supra notes 27–32, 55–56 and accompanying text. 
 70. See, e.g., Kate Royals, Rep. Karl Oliver: Those Removing Confederate Monuments ‘Should 
Be Lynched’, MISS. TODAY (May 21, 2017), http://mississippitoday.org/2017/05/21/rep-karl-oliver-
those-removing-confederate-monuments-should-be-lynched/ [http://perma.cc/FS2D-L7LZ] (quoting a 
Mississippi state representative who wrote that those involved in the “heinous and horrific” removal 
and destruction of Confederate monuments, “erected in the loving memory of our family and fellow 
Southern Americans, . . . should be LYNCHED!”). 
 71. See, e.g., Justin Fedich, Sons of Confederate Veterans Work To Preserve History of the South, 
FAYETTE COUNTY NEWS (Ga.) (July 1, 2017), http://fayette-news.net/sons-of-confederate-veterans-
work-to-preserve-confederate-history/ [http://perma.cc/MQ7Y-PTVT] (quoting a camp commander in 
the Sons of Confederate Veterans who argues that he and his associates should not “have to give up 
the recognition of [their] heroes, of [their] leaders,” and that honoring their dead Confederate 
ancestors “binds [them] together”); R. Kevin Stone, Opinion, Confederate Monuments Honor 
Sacrifice, ROANOKE-CHOWAN NEWS-HERALD (Nov. 29, 2017), http://www.dailyadvance.com/
Chowan/2017/11/29/Confederate-monuments-honor-sacrifice.html [http://perma.cc/9UA7-E5WS] 
(expressing dismay “that the legacy of [Confederate] ancestors is now being . . . tarnished”). 
 72. See, e.g., Alfred L. Brophy, Opinion, Why We Shouldn’t Pull Down All Those Confederate 
Memorials, NEWSWEEK (July 10, 2015), http://www.newsweek.com/why-we-shouldnt-pull-down-all-
those-confederate-memorials-352222 [http://perma.cc/968D-WU2R] (arguing that in eliminating 
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Frequently, those who wish monuments to remain in public places for these 
reasons also want to modify them to provide a balanced historical record, 
thereby transforming the monuments from a source of intimidation into an 
opportunity for education.73 But, as Section II shows, this sort of monument 
modification is ostensibly forbidden under most statue statutes to precisely the 
same degree as monument removal.74 Because the statutes forbid both 
modification and removal of Confederate monuments, this Article takes no 
position on whether outright removal or monument modification is the best 
approach, either generally or in any specific situation.75 
In sum, despite the enduring popularity of Confederate monuments with 
the general public, experts from a variety of disciplines have concluded that most 
Confederate monuments prominently displayed in public civic spaces should not 
remain—at least not in anything like their current places of honor.76 Indeed, in a 
 
Confederate monuments, “there’s a danger that we’ll forget the connections of past racial crimes to 
current racial inequality”); Felipe Fernández-Armesto, Opinion, Trump Is Right: Confederate 
Memorials Should Stay, TIMES HIGHER EDUC., (Sept. 14, 2017), http://www.timeshighereducation.
com/opinion/trump-right-confederate-memorials-should-stay [http://perma.cc/T4LC-96QD] (arguing 
that Confederate monuments “cannot hurt us, but can remind us of the lessons and legacies of the 
past”); Lawrence A. Kuznar, Opinion, I Detest Our Confederate Monuments. But They Should 
Remain., WASH. POST (Aug. 18, 2017), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/i-detest-our-confeder
ate-monuments-but-they-should-remain/2017/08/18/13d25fe8-843c-11e7-902a-2a9f2d808496_story.html 
[http://perma.cc/KG89-95BB] (arguing that preserving Confederate monuments is important because 
of their “constant testimony” to the devastating impact of racial discrimination). 
 73. See, e.g., Alfred Brophy, How Taking Down Confederate Monuments Just Covers Up a 
Larger Problem, FORTUNE (Aug. 18, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/08/18/confederate-monument-
removal-charlottesville [http://perma.cc/K3LX-K4RA] (insisting that the “monuments should not be 
left alone, but must be contextualized, so that they can serve as a daily lesson of what . . . the 
community once thought, and also how we think differently now”). 
 74. See infra Section II for a discussion of each statue statute’s restrictions on removal, 
modification, alteration, and other actions that local governments might take with respect to 
Confederate monuments. 
 75. Accordingly, references to either monument removal or monument modification in this 
Article are generally intended to be interchangeable. 
 76. Examples of academic criticism of the placement of Confederate monuments in public civic 
spaces without educational context could fill dozens of pages of footnote text. For some representative 
examples of academics from various disciplines who argue against the continued placement of such 
monuments in public civic spaces, see, for example, Gonzalo Casals et al., Tear Down the Confederate 
Monuments—But What Next? Twelve Art Historians and Scholars on the Way Forward, ARTNET NEWS 
(Aug. 23, 2017), http://news.artnet.com/art-world/confederate-monuments-experts-1058411 
[http://perma.cc/L7YR-NZQS] (gathering a range of expert opinions about the best way to remove or 
modify various Confederate monuments in public spaces); Julian Chambliss, Opinion, Don’t Call 
Them Memorials, FRIEZE (Aug. 23, 2017), http://frieze.com/article/dont-call-them-memorials 
[http://perma.cc/L5WA-9UEZ] (arguing that Confederate monuments in public civic spaces should 
neither be called nor treated as monuments, but rather as “political markers . . . [created] to celebrate 
the re-establishment of white rule after Reconstruction” that should be disposed of); Jane Dailey, 
Opinion, Baltimore’s Confederate Monument Was Never About ‘History and Culture’, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Aug. 17, 2017, 11:11 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/confederate-monuments-
history-trump-baltimore_us_5995a3a6e4b0d0d2cc84c952 [http://perma.cc/L5WA-9UEZ] (defending 
Baltimore’s removal of its Confederate monument, which “was designed to intimidate African 
Americans and to reassure white Americans in a moment of rising black power”); Kristine Phillips, 
Historians: No, Mr. President, Washington and Jefferson Are Not the Same as Confederate Generals, 
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recent statement, the American Historical Association recommended 
reconsidering the placement of Confederate monuments in public civic spaces 
because they were “part and parcel of the initiation of legally mandated 
segregation,” designed “to intimidate African Americans politically and isolate 
them from the mainstream of public life.”77 The Association concluded that 
altering or removing Confederate monuments from places of pride in public civic 
spaces neither changes nor erases history but merely alters what local 
communities “decide is worthy of civic honor.”78  
The statue statutes analyzed at length in this Article are even harder to 
defend than the continued existence of the underlying monuments themselves. 
Recall that many of the most thoughtful defenders of preserving Confederate 
monuments in public spaces wish to modify their presentation or to exclude 
them from certain particularly sensitive public spaces, in order to provide a 
balanced and more accurate record that honestly reckons with the history of 
violence and intimidation that these monuments have reinforced.79 But as Alfred 
Brophy has pointed out, the restrictions that statue statutes impose on local 
governments’ abilities to modify or remove monuments undercut the very 
arguments for the existence of such monuments in the first place.80  
Building upon this criticism of both the monuments themselves and the 
statue statutes that purport to protect them, some scholars have argued that 
 
WASH. POST (Aug. 16, 2017), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/retropolis/wp/2017/08/16/histor
ians-no-mr-president-washington-and-jefferson-are-not-the-same-as-confederate-generals [http://
perma.cc/LSE9-RVG2] (quoting numerous historians who argue that Confederate monuments in 
public civic spaces should be moved or “delegitimized” in some way); Nova Safo, Are Confederate 
Monuments Important Works of Art?, DAILY MAIL (London) (Aug. 18, 2017, 4:49 PM), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-4803916/Are-Confederate-monuments-important-works-
art.html [http://perma.cc/8Z46-TYYD] (gathering opinions of historians of art and concluding that 
most Confederate monuments are of “mediocre” aesthetic quality at best); Dell Upton, Confederate 
Monuments and Civic Values in the Wake of Charlottesville, SOC’Y ARCHITECTURAL HISTORIANS 
BLOG (Sept. 13, 2017), http://www.sah.org/publications-and-research/sah-blog/sah-blog/2017/09/13/
confederate-monuments-and-civic-values-in-the-wake-of-charlottesville [http://perma.cc/RL4N-833A] 
(concluding that “[w]hatever the [ultimate] disposition of the Confederate monuments, it seems clear 
that for reasons of justice, equity, and civic values, they must first of all be removed from civic space” 
because their “white-supremacist character is more important” than any aesthetic or historical 
attribute that can be offered in their defense). 
 77. AM. HISTORICAL ASS’N, STATEMENT ON CONFEDERATE MONUMENTS (2017), http://www.
historians.org/news-and-advocacy/statements-and-resolutions-of-support-and-protest/aha-statement-
on-confederate-monuments [http://perma.cc/J5Q3-STHD]. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See supra notes 72–75 and accompanying text; see also Alfred L. Brophy, Reframing a 
Historic Narrative, LEX, Fall 2018, at 25, 27 (suggesting that while there are some “good reasons” for 
keeping some modified Confederate monuments in some public spaces, “they should not be in front of 
courthouses, where they tell members of the community that they are not welcome”). 
 80. See, e.g., Alfred L. Brophy, Opinion, Legislating Confederate Monuments, WINSTON-SALEM 
J. (July 23, 2015), http://www.journalnow.com/opinion/columnists/alfred-l-brophy-legislating-
confederate-monuments/article_1db4acd4-309f-11e5-870c-73bbd75fa258.html [http://perma.cc/H64T-
RFUS] (concluding that, although “[t]here are good reasons not to remove Confederate [statues],” if, 
through state statue statutes, “we are going to get local governments out of the business of monument 
removal, maybe we should also get them out of the business of monument placement”). 
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these statutes are unconstitutional.81 These arguments are briefly reviewed in the 
following Part. 
B. The Constitutional Flaws of Statue Statutes 
The constitutional arguments against the statue statutes have taken many 
forms, but perhaps the most straightforward argument proceeds on free speech 
grounds. The free speech argument against statue statutes can be boiled down to 
something like the following: Forcing anyone—an individual, a local 
government—into expressive activity violates the First Amendment. Erecting 
and maintaining a statue in a public place is expressive activity. Accordingly, 
forcing local governments to erect or maintain statues in public places violates 
the First Amendment.82 
One of the necessary premises for this argument—the idea that local 
governments engage in expressive activity when they erect and maintain public 
monuments—was recognized by the Supreme Court in Pleasant Grove City v. 
Summum.83 In Summum, a religious organization founded in 1975 sought to 
erect a religious stone monument containing the “Seven Aphorisms of 
SUMMUM” in a public park that contained other monuments donated by 
private groups or individuals, including a wishing well, a monument to 
September 11, and a similarly sized stone monument of the Ten 
Commandments.84 The Court held that “[p]ermanent monuments displayed on 
public property typically represent government speech,” rather than the creation 
of a forum for private speech, because monuments, “by definition, [are] 
structure[s] . . . designed as a means of expression.”85 Indeed, noting the long 
history of monuments as government expression, the Court also held that even 
“privately financed and donated monuments” also “speak for the government” 
that accepts them and displays them on public land.86 Accordingly, the Court in 
Summum concluded that the city could reject a religious organization’s request 
to display and maintain a stone monument with religious texts in a public park, 
because the city’s choice about what monuments to accept and display on public 
property “is best viewed as a form of government speech.”87 As applied to 
Confederate monuments, then, some have argued that the reasoning of 
Summum should control for state statue statutes, which—like the losing religious 
organization in Summum itself—seek to compel an identical kind of local 
government expression, often against that local government’s wishes.88 
 
 81. See infra notes 88–91 and accompanying text. 
 82. Aneil Kovvali, Confederate Statute Removal, 70 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 82, 83 (2017) (“The 
free speech objection is simply stated. When a city government erects or maintains a monument, it is 
speaking. A statute forcing a city to retain a Confederate monument thus compels the city to engage in 
speech it finds offensive.”). 
 83. 555 U.S. 460 (2009). 
 84. Summum, 555 U.S. at 464–65. 
 85. Id. at 470. 
 86. Id. at 470–71. 
 87. Id. at 464–65, 481. 
 88. Kovvali, supra note 82, at 83–84. 
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A related constitutional argument against statue statutes is grounded in the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. This argument stems from 
the same premise outlined in the free speech context—the idea that a city’s 
decision to erect or maintain a monument is constitutionally significant 
expression. The key additional insight upon which this argument depends is that 
government entities, unlike private citizens, cannot engage in expression that 
denigrates racial or religious minorities without violating the Equal Protection 
Clause.89 In other words, a town could not erect a sign that read “This town is for 
whites only,” and local officials should recognize that Confederate monuments in 
public spaces represent something akin to such a sign.90 According to this 
argument, even if a state statute forbids it, local officials should rely on the 
supremacy of the Federal Constitution and conclude that removal of 
Confederate monuments is not only permissible but indeed required by the 
Equal Protection Clause.91 
Two additional constitutional arguments against statue statutes depart from 
the shared premise discussed above and focus instead on the individuals affected 
by Confederate monuments rather than the local governments forced to 
maintain monuments by these statutes. For example, some have argued that 
state statue statutes are unconstitutional because they violate the free speech 
acts of individual protesters against those monuments.92 They analogize the 
statue statutes to the prohibitions on flag burning deemed unconstitutional by 
the Supreme Court in Texas v. Johnson93 and United States v. Eichman.94 Like 
burning a flag, urging a local government to remove a protected monument 
qualifies as protected speech, and because this speech does not materially harm 
others, there is no legitimate state interest in suppressing it.95  
To be clear, the argument outlined here does not imply that anyone, acting 
on their own, has the right to remove or destroy an existing monument that 
belongs to their local government.96 Rather, this argument against the statue 
 
 89. See, e.g., Nelson Tebbe, Government Nonendorsement, 98 MINN. L. REV. 648, 648–49, 658–
65 (2013) (arguing that “[r]acialized government expression” can be an unconstitutional violation of 
both anticlassification and antisubordination interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause, just as religious government expression can violate the First Amendment’s 
Establishment Clause); see also Schwartzman & Tebbe, supra note 49 (applying these arguments to 
the case of Confederate monuments and state statue statutes). 
 90. Schwartzman & Tebbe, supra note 49. 
 91. Id. 
 92. E.g., Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Debate over Confederate Monuments, TAKE 
CARE (Aug. 25, 2017), http://takecareblog.com/blog/the-debate-over-confederate-monuments 
[http://perma.cc/9SUN-RQUE]. 
 93. 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (overturning a conviction for flag desecration as inconsistent with 
the First Amendment). 
 94. 496 U.S. 310, 318–19 (1990) (applying Texas v. Johnson and concluding that a flag protection 
statute could not constitutionally be applied). 
 95. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 92 (arguing that “[j]ust as in the case of flag desecration 
laws,” the goal of “avoiding offense is not a sufficient reason to stifle [the] expressive conduct” of 
those who wish to protest against or advocate for the removal of Confederate monuments). 
 96. See id. (“The constitutional right to be free of restrictions on flag burning . . . does not 
extend to burning a particular flag that belongs to someone else . . . .”). 
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statutes concludes that it is an unconstitutional restriction of expression for states 
to block the full expression of that sentiment with a statute. In other words, by 
“barring the removal of [a] monument” the state has also restricted expressive 
protest against the monuments, and in so doing the state has unconstitutionally 
placed its own “coercive weight on the expressive scales.”97 
A fourth and final argument for the unconstitutionality of statue statutes 
relies on the Equal Protection Clause. According to this argument, statue 
statutes distort the political process by making it more difficult for victims of 
discrimination to seek protection.98 This argument draws on analogies between 
statue statutes and local or state controls on antidiscrimination laws, like those at 
issue in Hunter v. Erickson99 and Romer v. Evans.100 
In Hunter, a city fair housing ordinance with robust antidiscrimination 
provisions led to widespread backlash.101 In turn, this backlash led to an 
amendment to the city charter, passed by a direct vote of the city’s voting 
electors during a general election, which provided that any future fair housing 
ordinances had to be approved by a majority of the electors during a general 
election before becoming operative.102 The Court in Hunter struck down this 
restrictive amendment to the city charter, holding that the amendment 
impermissibly discriminated against minorities in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause by imposing a system of restraints that made it more difficult 
to enact legislation on their behalf, which the Court concluded was the practical 
equivalent of diluting minorities’ votes or giving one group smaller 
representation than another of comparable size.103 
Similarly, in Romer, Colorado adopted an amendment to its state 
constitution prohibit local ordinances that limited discrimination based on sexual 
orientation.104 The Court in Romer struck down this state constitutional 
amendment on grounds similar to those invoked in Hunter, holding that it 
impermissibly limited the rights of a minority group by preventing them from 
obtaining redress from discrimination through targeted legislation.105 
Accordingly, some opponents of statue statutes have argued that they are 
analogously unconstitutional because, like the amendment to the city charter 
struck down in Hunter and the state constitutional amendment struck down in 
Romer, the statue statutes force those seeking remedies for discriminatory 
actions with a local or sublocal impact to convince larger groups for redress, 
 
 97. Id. 
 98. Kovvali, supra note 82, at 85. 
 99. 393 U.S. 385 (1969). 
 100. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 101. See Hunter, 393 U.S. at 386–87. 
 102. See id. at 387. 
 103. Id. at 392–93. 
 104. Romer, 517 U.S. at 623–25. 
 105. See id. at 631 (noting that the targeted minority, under the state constitutional amendment, 
“can obtain specific protection against discrimination only by enlisting the citizenry of Colorado to 
amend the State Constitution or perhaps . . . by trying to pass helpful laws of general applicability”). 
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thereby diluting their voting power.106 
For several reasons, many local governments will want to adopt some or all 
of the arguments outlined above even when they seek to act or litigate using the 
arguments discussed in Section II of this Article. First and most obviously, unlike 
the arguments outlined in Section II, the arguments discussed above do not seek 
opportunities for local action within the existing statutes; rather, they seek to 
sweep away the statue statutes altogether. And, if these arguments succeed, they 
will provide local governments that wish to remove or alter Confederate 
monuments with near-total freedom. 
In addition, even if the sweeping arguments outlined in this Part fail to 
persuade courts, they may nevertheless prove effective in swaying public 
opinion,107 which, as noted at the outset, still favors retaining Confederate 
monuments in many places.108 To take just one example, local governments may 
fail to convince courts that statue statutes violate the First Amendment.109 But 
merely articulating this argument may help make the public more aware of the 
problematic history and expressive content of the monuments themselves, as 
well as the injustice of compelling local governments to keep Confederate 
monuments in place when the local population wants them changed or removed. 
Perhaps more importantly, the strategies and arguments outlined below in 
Section II, which provide local governments with opportunities for action if the 
statue statutes survive, may have a useful role to play in advancing the 
arguments outlined here in Part I.B, which are designed to strike down the statue 
statutes altogether. More specifically, if local governments carefully challenge 
existing statue statutes along the lines discussed in Section II, then they should 
be able to frame the issues to enhance the constitutional arguments analyzed 
above. 
II. “FLAWED” IN PRACTICE: A CLOSE EXAMINATION OF STATE STATUE 
STATUTES REVEALS MANY OPPORTUNITIES FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO 
ALTER OR REMOVE CONFEDERATE MONUMENTS 
Section II examines the various opportunities for local governments to alter 
or remove Confederate monuments under the various individual statue statutes. 
These opportunities include: protections that may be limited based on the age of 
the monuments, protections that may be limited based on the location of the 
monuments, protections that may be limited based on the ownership of the 
monuments, and enforcement provisions that are limited or entirely absent 
under some statutes. This Article uses the term “opportunities” for local 
government action to refer to gaps in the near-universal protection for 
 
 106. Kovvali, supra note 82, at 85–87. 
 107. Cf. id. at 84 (noting that “[m]uch commentary has sought to defend the speech of 
protestors seeking to preserve” Confederate monuments, so it is surely “worth defending the speech of 
Charlottesville itself, a city that had rejected the monument and what it stands for”). 
 108. See supra notes 27–31 and accompanying text. 
 109. Kovvali, supra note 82, at 83 (noting that the free speech arguments against statue statutes 
“may or may not make for a winning legal challenge”). 
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Confederate monuments that these statutes are popularly presumed to 
provide—specific avenues left open under the statutes that local governments 
might exploit to modify or remove at least some Confederate monuments. 
Section II shows that many such opportunities exist and that statutes do not 
constitute impossible barriers to the modification or removal of Confederate 
monuments.110 
Of course, what this Article refers to as “opportunities” for local 
government action might seem like “flaws” in the statute from another 
perspective, one concerned with using the statue statutes to preserve 
Confederate monuments in places of public honor and respect. But, as discussed 
in Section I, this Article has already concluded that the primary flaw of the 
statutes is their existence in the first place. Thus, it would be most accurate to 
think of these as opportunities for local government action—a set of second-best 
solutions to the underlying problem that the statue statutes represent. More 
specifically, these opportunities represent solutions that interested local 
governments and sympathetic state officials may wish to consider pursuing so 
long as the statutes exist in something like their present condition. 
While many of the individual statue statutes provide similar opportunities 
for local government action, no two statutes share the exact same set of gaps. 
These discrepancies are due to differences in the construction and drafting of the 
statutes themselves, which were created at different times and, in some cases, 
amended many times as well.111 In addition, differences in the structures and 
drafting styles of the various statue statutes mean that some of the individual 
statutes have their own idiosyncratic gaps in coverage, which are not replicated 
in many or any other state’s statutes.112 As a result, the statue statutes defy easy 
categorization. Accordingly, the bulk of Section II provides a close critical 
review of each individual statute, picking out the opportunities for local 
government action unique to each. Section II also identifies opportunities for 
local government action that recur across multiple states’ statutes. 
One of the most promising opportunities for local government action 
relates to the time periods of some statutes’ coverage. More specifically, several 
of the statutes explicitly or implicitly break down the Confederate monuments 
into categories based on when the monuments were created,113 and some of 
these temporal categories of monuments may be mostly or even entirely 
unprotected. For example, Alabama’s statue statute provides different forms of 
protection to monuments that have been in place for less than twenty years, to 
those that have been in place for between twenty and forty years, and to those 
 
 110. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 111. For example, Virginia’s statute was originally passed in 1904, and it has since been 
amended or recodified ten times, see infra notes 126–139 and accompanying text, whereas Alabama’s 
statute was not enacted until 2017, see infra note 191 and accompanying text. 
 112. For example, Kentucky’s statute requires a state commission to approve potentially eligible 
monuments for protection under the statute; in other words, unlike other states’ statue statutes, 
monuments do not automatically qualify for protection based on their age or subject matter. See infra 
note 260 and accompanying text. 
 113. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 41-9-232 (West 2018). 
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that have been in place for over forty years.114 Local governments have already 
seized upon different versions of this opportunity in Charlottesville, Virginia,115 
and Birmingham, Alabama,116 where they are now being tested in litigation. 
A second opportunity for local government action presented by many but 
not all state statue statutes relates to the location of protected monuments. More 
specifically, some statue statutes refer to monuments that are currently located 
on or are themselves public property.117 This suggests that some local 
governments may be able to evade the restrictions by conveying either the 
monument itself or the civic space where the monument stands to a sympathetic 
private actor. This private actor could then remove or alter the Confederate 
monument free from penalty because the monument would no longer be or be 
located on public property.118 The City of Memphis recently attempted to take 
advantage of this opportunity, with efforts that were tested in litigation and then 
addressed by the Tennessee state legislature.119 Care must be taken by local 
governments when attempting to exploit this opportunity, for the mere 
substitution of private for public authority may not be enough for monuments, or 
the land on which they rest, to be treated as private property.120 In order to 
exploit this opportunity, local governments may need to separate themselves 
entirely from the management or control of the land where the monuments once 
 
 114. Id. 
 115. See Schragger, Robert E. Lee, supra note 47 (“Since the monuments statute did not apply to 
cities until 1997, [Charlottesville] is free to do whatever it wants with the monuments constructed prior 
to that year.”). But see Eric Hartley & Ana Ley, Judge Rules in Favor of Groups Trying To Keep 
Charlottesville’s Robert E. Lee Statue Where It Is, VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Oct. 4, 2017), 
http://pilotonline.com/news/government/virginia/article_bb1af08e-f426-53ee-ad72-c73239f99b45.html 
[http://perma.cc/7NLW-JURR] (noting that the initial ruling in the Charlottesville dispute was that the 
statute could apply retroactively to certain monuments). This ruling is contrary to that reached by 
other Virginia lower courts in other monuments disputes. See infra notes 156–157 and accompanying 
text. As a result, the Charlottesville dispute is expected to reach the Supreme Court of Virginia. 
Hartley & Ley, supra. Other Virginia cities wishing to remove or alter their own Confederate 
monuments will want to keep a close eye on Charlottesville’s case. Id. 
 116. Kayla Gladney, Mayor Bell Files Motion To Dismiss Lawsuit over Confederate Monument, 
CBS42 (Birmingham, Ala.) (Sept. 20, 2017, 12:36 PM), http://wiat.com/2017/09/20/mayor-bell-files-
motion-to-dismiss-lawsuit-over-confederate-monument/ [http://perma.cc/T733-EWPD]. 
 117. E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-1-412(a)–(b) (West 2018). 
 118. This gap in coverage may be less significant for those statue statutes that define protected 
monuments as those that were “erected” on public property, as such a formulation might protect such 
monuments even if their location has been ceded to a private group. Compare, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 10-1-165(A) (West 2018) (covering all monuments “erected on public property of the State or any of 
its political subdivisions”), with, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-1-412(b)(1) (covering any monument that 
presently “is, or is located on, public property”). See also infra notes 280–283 and accompanying text. 
 119. Ryan Poe, Forrest Family, Sons of Confederate Veterans Sue over Takedown of Memphis 
Statues, COM. APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.) (Jan. 12, 2018, 9:58 AM), http://www.commercialappeal.com/
story/news/government/city/2018/01/12/forrest-family-sons-confederate-veterans-sues-over-takedown-
memphis-statues/1027918001/ [http://perma.cc/8T4Q-7XVC] [hereinafter Poe, Forrest Family]. See 
also infra notes 178–186 and accompanying text for a discussion of the removal of the Memphis 
monuments and the state legislature’s response. 
 120. See, e.g., Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 300–02 (1966) (holding that a segregated park 
remained subject to the Fourteenth Amendment when a local government transferred it to private 
trustees). 
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stood,121 which may not be appropriate in every situation. In addition, local 
governments may face restrictions on how they can dispose of public property, 
which may frustrate buyers who are primarily or solely interested in purchasing 
the relevant property to help remove or alter a prominent Confederate 
monument.122 
A third opportunity for local government action presented by a few state 
statutes relates to the penalties, or lack thereof, for violations of the statutes. 
More specifically, although many of the statutes provide for steep fines and jail 
time for anyone who moves or modifies a covered monument,123 others are silent 
about the penalties for such actions.124 This absence of any real penalty for 
ostensibly forbidden actions, or “penalty gap,” creates obvious opportunities for 
action by local governments that wish to remove or modify Confederate 
monuments. Indeed, one such penalty gap in the Alabama statute is already part 
of litigation that has recently emerged over a Confederate monument in 
Birmingham.125 
These three main opportunities for local government action under the 
statue statutes—the temporal discrepancies, the exclusive focus on monuments 
that are or are located on public property, and the penalty gap—recur frequently 
across different jurisdictions. But because each statue statute was drafted with its 
own structure and language, each provides a unique set of challenges and 
opportunities for local governments that wish to alter or modify Confederate 
monuments. The remainder of Section II is given over to a detailed critical 
examination of each state’s statue statute. 
A. Virginia’s Statue Statute 
The history of Virginia’s general statue statute, the oldest and in many ways 
 
 121. See id. at 302 (noting that ongoing local control caused the “predominant character and 
purpose of [the] park [to remain] municipal” rather than private). The idea of privatizing parks will 
concern some readers, due in part to the history of this technique as a device to buttress segregation in 
situations like that reviewed in Evans v. Newton. Id. These concerns are entirely appropriate: 
privatizing the most public spaces in a community is strong medicine, which should not be lightly 
taken. Against these concerns must be set the desire of some local governments to address the 
presence of Confederate monuments in the communities’ public spaces. 
 122. For example, in North Carolina, with relatively few exceptions local governments are 
required to dispose of real property through one of a few specified competitive bidding procedures. 
See Tyler Mulligan, Sale of Historic Structures by NC Local Governments for Redevelopment, COATES’ 
CANONS: N.C. LOC. GOV’T L., UNC SCH. OF GOV’T (Dec. 16, 2014), http://canons.sog.unc.edu/sale-of-
historic-structures-by-nc-local-governments-for-redevelopment/ [http://perma.cc/52NS-L4YZ] (citing, 
inter alia, N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 160A-268 to -270 (West 2018)). 
 123. E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-137 (West 2018) (providing that violations of Virginia’s statue 
statute shall be treated as various degrees of misdemeanors or felonies, depending on the degree of 
intent behind the act and the value of the damage done to the monument). 
 124. See, for example, infra note 252 and accompanying text for a description of the absence of 
penalties from the Mississippi statue statute, and the pending and failed past attempts to amend the 
statute to incorporate penalties for its violation. 
 125. Gladney, supra note 116. 
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one of the most restrictive, dates back to 1904,126 although some Confederate 
monuments in Virginia were specifically authorized by earlier legislative 
action.127 The 1904 version of the general Virginia statue statute provided that 
the circuit court of a county, acting with the concurrence of that county’s board 
of supervisors, could “authorize and permit” anyone to erect “a Confederate 
monument upon the public square of such county at the county seat thereof.”128 
Once the monument was in place, neither the relevant local government 
agencies nor “any other person or persons whatever” could “disturb or 
interfere” with the monument.129 Finally, the statute also provided that neither 
the local government nor any other person could “prevent the citizens of said 
county from taking all proper measures and exercising all proper means for the 
protection, preservation, and care of” such a monument.130 The statute was then 
further amended or recodified in 1910,131 1930,132 1945,133 1962,134 1982,135 
1988,136 1997,137 1998,138 2005,139 and 2010.140 In addition to this general statue 
statute, as noted above, several Confederate monuments in Virginia were 
created by monument-specific state statutes, some of which contain specific 
restrictions on whether the monument at issue can be disturbed.141 As a result, 
some local governments may face additional restrictions on modifying or 
 
 126. Act of Feb. 19, 1904, Ch. 29, 1904 Va. Acts 62. The current version of Virginia’s statue 
statute, which reflects all subsequent amendments, is codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1812 (West 
2018). 
 127. See Va. Attorney General, Opinion Letter No. 17-032 (Aug. 25, 2017), 2017 WL 3901711, 
at *3 (noting that some of these state statutes specifically authorizing the erection of Confederate 
monuments predate the first version of Virginia’s general monument statute, and that some of the 
statue-specific statutes “contain restrictions on the disturbance of the monument” while “others are 
silent” on this issue). 
 128. Act of Feb. 19, 1904, Ch. 29, 1904 Va. Acts 62. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Act of Feb. 9, 1910, Ch. 17, § 1, 1910 Va. Acts 21, 22. 
 132. Act of Feb. 28, 1930, Ch. 76, 1930 Va. Acts 86. 
 133. Act of Apr. 5, 1945, Ch. 55, 1945 Va. Acts Extra Sess. 47. 
 134. Act of Apr. 3, 1962, Ch. 623, 1962 Va. Acts 960, 1027 (recodifying “the general laws of 
Virginia relating to counties, cities and towns,” including the statue statute at VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-
270). 
 135. Act of Mar. 9, 1982, Ch. 19, 1982 Va. Acts 21. 
 136. Act of Mar. 24, 1988, Ch. 284, 1988 Va. Acts 344. 
 137. Act of Mar. 20, 1997, Ch. 587, 1997 Va. Acts 976, 1114 (recodifying portions of the code, 
including the statue statute as VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1812). 
 138. Act of Apr. 16, 1998, Ch. 752, 1998 Va. Acts 1814. 
 139. Act of Mar. 21, 2005, Ch. 390, 2005 Va. Acts 523. 
 140. Act of Apr. 21, 2010, Ch. 860, 2010 Va. Acts 1821 (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 15.2-1812). Many of these changes were made to include monuments to subsequent conflicts within 
the ambit of the statute, such as including the “World War” after World War I, see Act of Feb. 28, 
1930, Ch. 76, 1930 Va. Acts 86, while other changes had a more substantive impact on the kinds of 
monuments that might be covered, as is seen below. For the sake of brevity, a substantive discussion of 
the majority of the intervening changes is omitted, except where they have relevance to the current 
version of the statute or a particular monument conflict. 
 141. Va. Attorney General, Opinion Letter No. 17-032 (Aug. 25, 2017), 2017 WL 3901711, at *3. 
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removing monuments.142 
In its current form, the general Virginia statue statute covers “Confederate 
or Union monuments or memorials of the War Between the States” as well as 
monuments or memorials to over fourteen additional “war[s] or conflict[s]” 
ranging from colonial conflicts in the seventeenth century to Operation Iraqi 
Freedom.143 Exactly what counts as a “monument” or “memorial” to one of the 
covered conflicts is unclear, but a nonmilitary memorial to the Confederacy 
might not be protected. For example, Virginia’s attorney general has suggested 
that this language should be read to exclude markers about the historical 
significance of buildings, while including only monuments to the conflicts 
themselves or veterans of those conflicts.144 
As under the original statute, once a covered monument is in place, the 
statute prohibits anyone from “disturb[ing] or interfer[ing]” with it; the statute 
also prohibits the local government, “or any other person[s],” from “prevent[ing] 
its citizens from taking proper measures and exercising proper means for the 
protection, preservation and care of” such a monument.145 The present version 
of the statute defines “disturb or interfere with” to include removing monuments 
as well as acts of physical damage or vandalism.146 The statutory language 
“disturb or interfere with” is also specifically defined to cover, in the case of Civil 
War monuments, “the placement of Union markings or monuments on 
previously designated Confederate memorials” or the reverse in the case of 
monuments to the Union.147 Violation of the statute by anyone who “destroys, 
defaces, damages,” “removes,” or “breaks down” a covered monument is a 
criminal offense punishable as either a misdemeanor or felony depending on the 
degree of lost value to the monument in question.148 In addition, anyone who 
violates the statute or otherwise “encroache[s] upon” a protected monument 
may face a civil action for damages, including attorney’s fees and the potential 
for punitive damages.149 
Like the original version of Virginia’s statue statute, there are no 
restrictions regarding who may erect the covered monument—all monuments 
that otherwise meet the descriptive characteristics of the statute will be covered, 
so long as they were originally authorized by the local government.150 Unlike the 
 
 142. See id. at *3 & nn.35–36 (noting the existence of monument-specific statutes related to 
Confederate monuments in the public squares of Amelia, Bedford, Botetourt, Campbell, Greensville, 
King and Queen, King William, Mecklenburg, New Kent, Orange, and Rappahannock Counties). 
 143. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1812 (West 2018). 
 144. Va. Attorney General, Opinion Letter No. 15-050 (Aug. 6, 2015), 2015 WL 4850422, at *1–
2. 
 145. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1812. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. See id. § 18.2-137 (determining misdemeanor or felony punishment depending on whether 
the value of or damage to the property is less than $1,000). 
 149. Id. § 15.2-1812.1. Punitive damages are available for reckless, willful, or wanton violations 
of the underlying statue statute, including the willful “unlawful removal” of protected monuments. Id. 
 150. Id. § 15.2-1812. 
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original version of the statute, the current version does not include any 
restrictions on the local government agencies that may authorize the creation of 
a covered monument or memorial.151 Similarly, and also unlike the original 
version of the statute, there are no restrictions on the location of the covered 
monument or memorial. Thus, the current statutory language might appear to 
protect monuments created with local government approval even if they are not 
on public property.152 As Richard Schragger has pointed out, however, the 
original version of the statute applied only to monuments erected by county 
governments, not city governments,153 and, more particularly, only to 
monuments erected in the public square of the county seat.154 In other words, 
Virginia’s statue statute does not appear to apply to Confederate monuments 
built in cities or by city governments before 1997 and thus does not prevent their 
alteration or removal.155 
These issues are currently being litigated, and they may well reach 
Virginia’s highest court, but to date lower courts in Virginia as well as the state’s 
attorney general have adopted the interpretation of the relevant statutory 
language that would provide at least some local governments in Virginia with 
freedom to move or alter at least some monuments. In Heritage Preservation 
Ass’n v. City of Danville,156 a Virginia court held that the expansive changes to 
Virginia’s statue statute did not apply retroactively.157 Yet another attempt to 
amend the statute—this time in order to make its expanded provisions apply 
retroactively—failed in 2016,158 and Virginia’s attorney general recently 
endorsed the view of the statute adopted in Heritage Preservation.159 
 
 151. Compare id. (providing that “[a] locality may, within the geographical limits of the locality, 
authorize and permit the erection of” covered monuments), with Act of Feb. 19, 1904, Ch. 29, 1904 Va. 
Acts 62 (referring only to monuments created with the approval of a county’s circuit court and board 
of supervisors). This change, expanding the statute to cover any “locality” rather than specific county-
level government actors, was made in the 1997 revisions to the statute. Act of Mar. 20, 1997, Ch. 587, 
1997 Va. Acts 976, 1114. 
 152. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1812 (providing that “[a] locality may, within the 
geographical limits of the locality, authorize and permit the erection of” covered monuments), with 
Act of Feb. 19, 1904 (referring only to monuments erected in the public squares of county seats). See 
also Va. Attorney General, Opinion Letter No. 17-032 (Aug. 25, 2017), 2017 WL 3901711, at *3 
(discussing the implications of this change). This change—expanding the statute to cover monuments 
anywhere within a “locality[’s]” geographic ambit, rather than the locality’s own property—was made 
in the 1998 revisions to the statute. Act of Apr. 16, 1998, Ch. 752, 1998 Va. Acts 1814. 
 153. Schragger, Robert E. Lee, supra note 47. 
 154. Act of Feb. 19, 1904. 
 155. Amanda Lineberry, Essay, Payne v. City of Charlottesville and the Dillon’s Rule Rationale 
for Removal, 104 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 45, 57 (2018). 
 156. No. CL15000500-00 (Va. Cir. Ct., Dec. 7, 2015) (final order and ruling from the bench). An 
appeal of this decision was dismissed in 2016. Elizabeth Tyree, Virginia Supreme Court Again Rejects 
Confederate Flag Appeal in Danville, WSET (Oct. 7, 2016), http://wset.com/news/local/virginia-
supreme-court-again-rejects-confederate-flag-appeal-in-danville [http://perma.cc/29F5-KPK4]. 
 157. Heritage Pres. Ass’n, slip op. at 2. 
 158. See 2016 Session: HB 587 Memorials and Monuments; Protection of All Memorials, Etc., 
VA.’S LEGIS. INFO. SYS., http://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?161+sum+HB587 [http://perma.cc/
8MEF-UJCQ] (last visited Nov. 1, 2018) (providing text, summary, and history of this legislation). 
 159. Va. Attorney General, Opinion Letter No. 17-032 (Aug. 25, 2017), 2017 WL 3901711, at *3. 
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All of this means that the current version of the statute should not apply to 
any monuments constructed prior to 1904, the year in which the original version 
of the statute was passed. Nor should it apply to monuments that were erected 
anywhere other than the “public square” of a county seat prior to the substantive 
revisions in the late 1990s.160 Neither the current version of the statute nor any of 
the previous versions of the statute define “public square,” but otherwise 
unrelated Virginia legislation that predates the 1904 enactment suggests that it 
may refer to public land where official county buildings such as a courthouse or 
clerk’s office are located.161 Put another way, the current version of the Virginia 
statute should be interpreted as protecting only monuments created after 1904, 
and for all monuments created between 1904 and 1997 it should protect only 
those that were created in the “public square” of a county seat. 
B. Tennessee’s Statue Statute 
The Tennessee Heritage Protection Act is an example of the recent crop of 
statue statutes that are either titled or frequently referred to as “Heritage 
Protection Acts.”162 Unlike Virginia’s statue statute, the original version of 
Tennessee’s statue statute only dates back to 2013.163 While the Tennessee 
statute does not single out the Confederacy or Confederate monuments, there 
can be little doubt that it was motivated primarily by a concern for Confederate 
monuments. For example, when the original 2013 version of the statute was 
enacted, the Tennessee Division of the Sons of Confederate Veterans hailed it as 
“one of the greatest documents in modern history,” in part because it would 
“clearly hereafter protect” a number of Confederate monuments, including some 
targeted for removal or renaming by local government officials in Memphis.164 
The Tennessee Division of the Sons of Confederate Veterans also pointed out 
that its own chief of protocol and lieutenant commander wrote and introduced 
the bill to the Tennessee House, and its division commander introduced the bill 
to the Tennessee Senate.165 
In its current form, the Tennessee statute provides that “no memorial 
regarding a historic conflict, historic entity, historic event, historic figure, or 
 
 160. See id.; Act of Apr. 16, 1998, Ch. 752, 1998 Va. Acts 1814. 
 161. E.g., Act of Mar. 6, 1890, Ch. 632, 1889–1890 Va. Private Acts 1016; see also Opinion Letter 
No. 17-032, 2017 WL 3901711, at *3 n.25 (discussing the possible meaning of “public square” in the 
statue statutes). 
 162. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 163. Tennessee Heritage Protection Act of 2013, Pub. Ch. No. 75, 2013 Tenn. Pub. Acts (current 
version at TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-1-412). 
 164. Chuck Demastus, Tennessee Passes Heritage Protection Act (Mailing from the N.B. Forrest 
Camp 215 of Memphis and the Tennessee Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans), S. HERITAGE 
NEWS & VIEWS (May 11, 2013, 11:09 AM), http://shnv.blogspot.com/2013/05/tennessee-passes-
heritage-protection-act.html [http://perma.cc/FP6D-AUY7]. 
 165. Id.; see also Liliana Segura, Forrest the Butcher: Memphis Wants To Remove a Statue 
Honoring First Grand Wizard of the KKK, INTERCEPT (Sept. 2, 2017, 8:00 AM), http://
theintercept.com/2017/09/02/memphis-wants-to-remove-statue-honoring-kkk-grand-wizard-nathan-
bedford-forrest/ [http://perma.cc/49TZ-66QY] (quoting Division Chief of Protocol and Lieutenant 
Commander Lee Millar, who acknowledged that he was at least “one of the authors” of the statute). 
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historic organization that is, or is located on, public property, may be removed, 
renamed, relocated, altered, rededicated, or otherwise disturbed or altered” 
without a waiver from the Tennessee Historical Commission (Tennessee 
Commission or Commission).166 Anyone “who can demonstrate . . . aesthetic, 
architectural, cultural, economic, environmental, or historic injury” related to the 
monument can bring an action for injunctive relief to enforce the statute and 
protect covered monuments.167 
The Tennessee Commission is a twenty-nine-member board; twenty-four of 
its members are gubernatorial appointees, and five are state officials, including 
the governor.168 A public entity exercising control of a covered memorial may 
petition the Tennessee Commission in writing for a waiver of the statute’s 
protections, specifying a “material or substantial need . . . based on historical or 
other compelling public interest” and providing publication notice with 
identification of potentially interested parties.169 The requisite “material or 
substantial need” for a waiver must be demonstrated at the conclusion of a 
hearing process before the Commission “by clear and convincing evidence.”170 
Under the current version of Tennessee’s statue statute, a waiver must receive a 
two-thirds vote of the entire board by a roll call vote.171 This is a change from the 
original version of the statute, which allowed a majority of the members of the 
Tennessee Commission’s board present at the waiver hearing to grant waivers.172 
The current version of the statute also contains an amendment to the original 
2013 version that allows virtually anyone aggrieved by the final decision of the 
waiver process to seek review of the Commission’s decision in court.173 
In addition to the waiver process, the Tennessee statue statute covers an 
extremely broad range of monuments. As defined and protected by the 
Tennessee statute, “[h]istoric conflict[s]” include the “War Between the States,” 
as well as sixteen other conflicts from colonial times to the present, including 
 
 166. TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-1-412(b)(1), (c) (West 2018). 
 167. Id. § 4-1-412(d). 
 168. See id. § 4-11-102(a). The five voting ex officio members contemplated by the statute are 
“the governor or the governor’s designee, the state historian, the state archaeologist, the commissioner 
of environment and conservation or the commissioner’s designee, and the state librarian and 
archivist.” Id. 
 169. Id. § 4-1-412(c)(2)–(3). 
 170. Id. § 4-1-412(c)(8)(A). 
 171. Id. § 4-1-412(c)(8)(B). 
 172. See Tennessee Heritage Protection Act of 2013, Pub. Ch. No. 75, 2013 Tenn. Pub. Acts 
(providing, in the since-amended section 4-1-412(d) of the Tennessee Code, that the “commission may 
grant a petition for waiver by a majority vote of those present and voting”). At the time that the 
statute was amended, opposed state legislators argued that the purpose of the amendment was “to 
gum up the works and make it virtually certain that a small minority of people can make it impossible 
to [get rid of] a bust of Nathan Bedford Forrest.” See Andy Sher, TN House Passes Bill Making It 
Harder To Remove Monuments to Controversial Figures, TIMES FREE PRESS (Chattanooga, Tenn.) 
(Feb. 18, 2016), http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/politics/state/story/2016/feb/18/tn-house-passes-
bill-making-it-harder-remove-monuments-controversial-figures/350800/ [http://perma.cc/DX22-N5DR] 
(quoting former Tennessee House Democratic Caucus Chair Mike Stewart). 
 173. TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-1-412(d). 
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“Operation Urgent Fury (Grenada).”174 The statute defines protected “[h]istoric 
entit[ies],” “event[s],” “figure[s],” and “organization[s]” broadly, referring to any 
token of these categories “recognized as having state, national, military, or 
historical significance.”175 Covered “[m]emorial[s]” are defined as any public 
property, or almost anything located on public property, which has been erected 
for, named for, or dedicated in honor of a covered historic entity, event, figure, 
or organization.176 
The protection afforded to Confederate memorials by Tennessee’s statue 
statute is, in some respects, broader than that provided by some other states. For 
example, there are no temporal coverage gaps in Tennessee’s statute, as there 
are in other states’ statutes reviewed in this Section.177 But despite the statute’s 
apparent breadth, there has been one significant gap in its coverage. Beyond the 
waiver process and the broad definitions of covered memorials, the monument 
protections in the Tennessee statute are limited to memorials that either 
themselves are public property or that are located on public property.178 By 
“[p]ublic property,” the statute refers to “all property owned, leased, rented, 
managed, or maintained by” any level of state or local government, or by any 
other entity created by an act of the state legislature “to perform any public 
function.”179 
Despite the apparent breadth of this definition of public property, the 
statute’s focus on protecting only those monuments that are or are on public 
property created an obvious hole in the statute’s coverage. If an otherwise-
covered monument ever ceased to be on public property, then it would no longer 
be protected by the statute. In other words, a local government that wanted to 
get rid of an ostensibly protected monument could do so, so long as it first 
conveyed the property on which the monument stands to a sympathetic private 
actor, which then could alter or move the monument unburdened by the statute. 
In late December 2017 this is exactly what Memphis did for two of its 
Confederate monuments. Local groups with an interest in preserving the 
monuments swiftly filed suit.180 On May 16, 2018, the Tennessee Chancery Court 
issued an order dissolving the plaintiff’s temporary restraining order, dismissing 
the plaintiff’s suit for injunctive relief, and staying any further sale or transfer of 
 
 174. Id. § 4-1-412(a)(2). 
 175. Id. § 4-1-412(a)(3)–(6). 
 176. See id. § 4-1-412(a)(7) (defining “Memorial” as “[a]ny public real property or park, 
preserve, or reserve,” or “[a]ny statue, monument, memorial, bust, nameplate, historical marker, 
plaque, artwork, flag, historic display, school, street, bridge, or building”). 
 177. See, for example, supra and infra notes 160–161, 205, 214–217 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of the temporal gaps in the Virginia and Alabama statue statutes. 
 178. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-1-412(b)(1) (“[N]o memorial . . . that is, or is located on, public 
property, may be removed, renamed, relocated, altered, rededicated, or otherwise disturbed or 
altered.”). 
 179. Id. § 4-1-412(a)(8). 
 180. See Sons of Confederate Veterans Nathan Bedford Forrest Camp 215 v. City of Memphis, 
No. 18-29-III (Tenn. Ch. May 16, 2018), appeal filed, No. M2018-01096-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. 
filed June 13, 2018); see also Poe, Forrest Family, supra note 119. 
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the statues pending the plaintiff’s potential appeal.181 In its order, the court 
noted that the governing language from the 2016 version of Tennessee’s statue 
statute “does not apply to private property” and “the Statues were located on 
and were removed from private property” following the city’s donation of the 
land around the monuments to a private entity.182 In response to the city’s 
efforts, the Tennessee state legislature voted to strip $250,000 from the state’s 
2019 budget that had been earmarked for the Memphis bicentennial.183 Several 
state legislators who supported the budgetary cut justified their votes by calling 
the city’s careful attempts to comply with the statute “sneaky” and the work 
product of “smart lawyers.”184  
Perhaps more importantly, in addition to punishing Memphis for its careful 
compliance with a poorly drafted statute, the state legislature also revised the 
statute, in an attempt to prevent other Tennessee cities from using the same 
technique.185 Tennessee’s statue statute now provides that “[n]o memorial or 
public property that contains a memorial may be sold, transferred, or otherwise 
disposed of by a county, metropolitan government, municipality, or other 
political subdivision of this state.”186 This revision to the statute has not faced a 
significant test at the time of this writing, but it does appear to restrict future 
local governments in Tennessee from exploiting the statute’s “public property” 
language in exactly the same way as Memphis. There may, however, still be 
opportunities for local governments to use the “public property” language in the 
statute to make modifications to how such monuments are displayed. While the 
revised statutory language may well prohibit the future sale or transfer of 
monuments themselves or of public property that contains a memorial,187 it may 
not prohibit, for example, local governments from transferring public property 
around or near the memorial to a third party, which could then erect displays or 
other materials to change the memorial’s presentation. Such displays might 
count as prohibited alterations or disturbances of a memorial that is or is located 
on public property without such a transfer.188 But such displays might not count 
as prohibited alterations or disturbances if they occur on private property—even 
 
 181. Sons of Confederate Veterans Nathan Bedford Forrest Camp 215, slip op. at 3–4; see also 
Ryan Poe, Chancellor: Memphis Confederate Statues Takedown Was Legal, COM. APPEAL (Memphis, 
Tenn.) (May 16, 2018, 5:37 PM), http://www.commercialappeal.com/story/news/government/city/
2018/05/16/chancellor-memphis-confederate-statues-takedown-legal/617518002/ [http://perma.cc/6CS2-
3QQ7] (quoting advocates of statue removal who argued that the statue and statute defenders “lost 
the Civil War, and . . . just lost this one, too”). 
 182. Sons of Confederate Veterans Nathan Bedford Forrest Camp 215, slip op. at 14. 
 183. Chas Sisk, Tennessee Strips $250,000 from Memphis as Payback for Removing Confederate 
Statues, NPR (Apr. 18, 2018, 11:02 AM), http://www.npr.org/2018/04/18/603525897/tennessee-strips-
250-000-from-memphis-as-payback-for-removing-confederate-statue [http://perma.cc/YB6F-TPGF]. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Act of May 21, 2018, Pub. Ch. 1033, 2018 Tenn. Pub. Acts (codified as amended at TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 4-1-412). 
 186. TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-1-412(b)(2) (West 2018). 
 187. Id. 
 188. See id. § 4-1-412(b)(1) (“[N]o memorial . . . that is, or is located on, public property, may be 
removed, renamed, relocated, altered, rededicated, or otherwise disturbed or altered.”). 
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newly private property—adjacent to the memorial, because the 2018 revisions 
merely added additional statutory language regarding the sale or transfer of 
property containing monuments,189 rather than addressing the inherent 
limitations of the public property provision itself.190 
C. Alabama’s Statue Statute 
Alabama’s statue statute, enacted in 2017, is the latest example of the recent 
crop of Heritage Protection Acts.191 The Alabama statute purports to protect 
“monument[s] which [are] located on public property” as well as “architecturally 
significant building[s], memorial building[s], [and] memorial street[s].”192 The 
statute defines a “monument” as a “statue, portrait, or marker intended at the 
time of dedication to be a permanent memorial to” some “event,” “person,” 
“group,” “movement, or military service that is part of the history of the people 
or geography now comprising the State of Alabama.”193 
Similarly, the statute defines “memorial building,” “memorial school,” and 
“memorial street” as anything else that is located on public property and 
“erected for, or named or dedicated in honor of,” some “event,” “person,” 
“group,” “movement, or military service.”194 It defines “architecturally 
significant building[s]” as buildings “located on public property” that meet the 
statute’s definition of monument by their “nature, inherent design, or 
structure.”195 Last, “public property” is defined broadly as all property owned by 
the state, any local government in the state, or “any other entity created by act of 
the Legislature to perform any public function.”196 While the Alabama statue 
statute does not single out the Confederacy or Confederate monuments (and 
there is no historic predecessor statute that does), the timing of the statute’s 
passage suggests that it was motivated in large part by a concern for Confederate 
monuments. To take just two examples, the bill that became the Alabama statute 
was introduced shortly after Confederate flags were ordered removed from 
Alabama’s capitol,197 and the statute itself was enacted shortly after New 
 
 189. Id. § 4-1-412(b)(2). Other sections of the Tennessee statute prohibit the concealment of 
protected memorials for more than forty-five days. Id. § 4-1-412(b)(3)(B). Accordingly, the Tennessee 
statute might be read as prohibiting transfers to private actors that result in concealment of the 
monuments for longer than this time period, although other efforts to put the monuments in context 
on newly private property might be permissible. 
 190. See id. § 4-1-412(b)(1) (“[N]o memorial . . . that is, or is located on, public property, may be 
removed, renamed, relocated, altered, rededicated, or otherwise disturbed or altered.”). 
 191. Alabama Memorial Preservation Act of 2017, Act No. 2017-354, 2017 Ala. Laws (codified 
as amended at ALA. CODE §§ 41-9-230 to -237). 
 192. ALA. CODE § 41-9-232(a)–(b) (West 2018). 
 193. Id. § 41-9-231(6). 
 194. Id. § 41-9-231(3)–(5). 
 195. Id. § 41-9-231(1). 
 196. Id. § 41-9-231(7). 
 197. Rhonda Brownstein, SPLC: Alabama’s Memorial Preservation Act Is About Protecting 
Confederate Monuments, S. POVERTY L. CTR. (May 25, 2017), http://www.splcenter.org/news/2017/05/
25/splc-alabamas-memorial-preservation-act-about-protecting-confederate-monuments [http://perma.
cc/G3BU-RRKM]. 
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Orleans removed several of its own Confederate monuments.198 
Protected monuments, buildings, and memorials fall into different 
classifications under the Alabama statue statute. Those that are “located on 
public property” and have been “so situated for 40 or more years” may not be 
“relocated, removed, altered, renamed, or otherwise disturbed,” full stop.199 
Those that are located on public property and have been “so situated for at least 
20 years, and less than 40 years” may be relocated or altered, but only after the 
local government in question wins approval from the Committee on Alabama 
Monument Protection (Alabama Committee or Committee).200 
The Alabama Committee is made up of four members of the Alabama state 
legislature, three local government officials appointed by the governor, and four 
additional at-large appointees.201 If a local government wishes to relocate or 
otherwise disturb a protected monument, building, or memorial that has been in 
place for more than twenty but less than forty years, it must petition the 
Alabama Committee for a waiver of the statue statute’s restrictions, which the 
Committee can then either grant or deny.202 If any “entity exercising control of 
public property” protected by the statute has “disturbed” the monument at issue 
without first obtaining a waiver from the Alabama Committee, then the statute 
directs the Alabama attorney general to collect a fine of $25,000 for each such 
violation.203 
Despite the onerous nature of the Committee’s review process and the stiff 
financial penalties provided for those who disturb ostensibly protected 
monuments, the protections provided by Alabama’s statue statute are among the 
 
 198. Derek Cosson, Alabama Gov. Signs Law Protecting Confederate Monuments, PULSE (May 
25, 2017), http://pulsegulfcoast.com/2017/05/alabama-gov-signs-law-protecting-confederate-
monuments [http://perma.cc/FJ99-CFHA]. National and local coverage of the statute’s passage 
focused almost exclusively on the statute’s impact on Confederate monuments. See, e.g., Brandon 
Moseley, Legislature Passes Confederate Monuments Preservation Bill, ALA. POL. REP. (May 20, 
2017), http://www.alreporter.com/2017/05/20/legislature-passes-confederate-monuments-preservation-
bill/ [http://perma.cc/8EPM-EDJE]; Joe Sterling, A New Alabama Law Makes Sure Confederate 
Monuments Are Here To Stay, CNN (May 26, 2017, 5:19 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/05/26/us/
alabama-confederate-monuments-bill-trnd/index.html [http://perma.cc/T2MG-Y7BY]. 
 199. ALA. CODE § 41-9-232(a). 
 200. Id. §§ 41-9-232(b), -235. Similarly, memorial schools located on public property for more 
than twenty years, as those terms are defined by the statute, may only be renamed pursuant to the 
approval of the Alabama Committee. Id. §§ 41-9-232(c), -235. 
 201. Id. § 41-9-234(a)–(b). The four committee members from the Alabama legislature are to be 
split between the state House of Representatives and Senate, and between the majority and minority 
parties. Id. § 41-9-234(b)(1)–(2). Two of the additional at-large appointments are made by the 
governor, one by the speaker of the Alabama House of Representatives, and one by the president pro 
tempore of the Alabama Senate. Id. § 41-9-234(b)(3)–(5). Unlike similar commissions for other state 
statue statutes, the Alabama statute contemplates that a list of potential nominees be submitted for 
these at-large appointees by a number of state historical groups, including the Black Heritage Council. 
Id. § 41-9-234(c). 
 202. Id. § 41-9-235(a)(1). If the Alabama Committee fails to address the waiver petition within 
ninety days, it is deemed granted. Id. § 41-9-235(a)(2)(c). 
 203. Id. § 41-9-235(a)(2)(d). The same penalty applies to any local government entity exercising 
control over a protected monument that fails to comply with any conditions and instructions issued by 
the Alabama Committee after granting a waiver. Id. 
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most threadbare of all of the statutes reviewed here. First, the statute is entirely 
silent with respect to monuments, buildings, or memorials that have been in 
place on public property for less than twenty years.204 This is the most obvious of 
the many gaps in the Alabama statute’s protections, but it is also the least 
significant: only six Confederate monuments in Alabama have been in place on 
public property for less than twenty years prior to the statute’s passage.205 
More importantly, like the statue statutes in Tennessee and other states,206 
the Alabama statute is silent with respect to otherwise covered monuments, 
buildings, or memorials that are not located on “public property.”207 Indeed, 
another provision in the Alabama statue statute makes this public property 
coverage gap potentially even more significant than in states like Tennessee, 
because Alabama’s statue statute also contains a specific exception for 
otherwise-protected “[a]rt and artifacts in the collections of museums, archives, 
and libraries.”208 This suggests that if a local government entity donates the 
public property on which an otherwise-protected monument sits to a private 
entity, and that private entity then conveys the monument to a museum, archive, 
or library—undefined in the statute—then the once-protected monument would 
be doubly removed from the statute’s ostensible protections.209 
As significant as this public property gap may be for local governments in 
Alabama that wish to remove or modify ostensibly protected Confederate 
monuments, an additional opportunity for local action under the statute may 
prove equally or even more significant. It is easiest to see this opportunity as the 
product of three related classifications and procedural decisions made in the 
statute. First, the statute does not provide for any penalties for anyone who 
disturbs statues that have been protected for more than forty years.210 Second, 
there is no referral and waiver process to the Alabama Committee for such 
monuments—the referral and waiver process only applies to monuments that 
have been in place for twenty to forty years.211 Third, the penalties in the statute 
all relate to violations of decisions by or failures to obtain waivers from the 
Committee.212 More specifically, the penalties contemplated by the statute are to 
be imposed upon any local government entity that disturbs a protected 
monument “without first obtaining a waiver from the committee as required by 
 
 204. See id. § 41-9-232. 
 205. GUNTER ET AL., supra note 64, at 17–18. 
 206. E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-1-412(b)(1) (West 2018). 
 207. ALA. CODE § 41-9-232(a). 
 208. Id. § 41-9-236(1). 
 209. In addition to this exception for art and artifacts in museums, archives, and libraries, 
section 41-9-236 also contains a number of additional exceptions. Id. § 41-9-236. But these additional 
exceptions have not been discussed at greater length here because they deal with otherwise-covered 
monuments that might interfere with public transportation, utility service, or port services. Id. Local 
governments might argue that almost any otherwise-covered monument interferes with public 
transportation or utility services, but not all such arguments would be of equal merit or could be made 
in good faith. 
 210. Id. 
 211. See id. § 41-9-235(a)(1) (referring to id. § 41-9-232(b)–(c)). 
 212. Id. § 41-9-235(a)(2)(d). 
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this article” or which “fail[s] to comply with the conditions and instructions 
issued” along with a waiver.213 
But because the statute only contemplates waiver applications for 
otherwise-covered monuments, buildings, and memorials that have been in place 
for twenty to forty years, local governments that modify monuments that have 
been in place for more than forty years face no penalty—at least, there is no 
penalty provided by the statute. This is because, under the statute, there is no 
procedure established for them to engage with the Alabama Committee. Thus, 
for monuments of this age, there is no way for local governments to trigger the 
statute’s penalties by violating either the waiver process or a decision of the 
Committee about a waiver application.214 To sum up, in the words of one 
associate city attorney and Alabama state legislator who voted against the statue 
statute, this gap in coverage renders the statute “essentially unenforceable,” at 
least when it comes to monuments that are more than forty years old.215 As 
noted earlier, this coverage gap is the subject of a challenge by the City of 
Birmingham that is ongoing as of the time of this writing,216 and private groups 
and other local governments in Alabama are considering making similar 
challenges.217 
D. Georgia’s Statue Statute 
Georgia’s statue statute is one small piece of a larger series of code sections, 
which primarily focus on Georgia’s state flag and date back over a century.218 
The monument protection language was added in 2001,219 as part of an 
attempted compromise to resolve a long-simmering conflict over Georgia’s state 
flag, which had long incorporated Confederate designs and symbols.220 But the 
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horrible” and because it is “impractical” but also because “it was poorly drafted” and that successful 
legal challenges to the statute will likely show “just how bad the law is.” Id. 
 216. See infra note 317 and accompanying text; see also Gladney, supra note 116. 
 217. E.g., Kyle Gassiott, State of Alabama Fights Local Community over Confederate Statue, 
MARKETPLACE (Mar. 14, 2018, 6:58 AM), http://www.marketplace.org/2018/03/14/life/lawsuit-over-
protest-confederate-statue-alabama-heads-court [http://perma.cc/RH5X-UEQX]. 
 218. Act of Aug. 21, 1916, No. 565, § 3(61), 1916 Ga. Laws 158, 178. The current version of 
Georgia’s statue statute, which reflects all subsequent amendments, is codified at GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 50-3-1. The portion of the current statute dealing with the state flag is section 50-3-1(a), whereas the 
monument protection language begins at section 50-3-1(b). For a thoughtful analysis of the history of 
the state statutory treatment of Georgia’s flag and how the monument protection language came to be 
added to this section of the Georgia Code, see generally Darren Summerville, New State Flag, 18 GA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 305 (2001). 
 219. Act of Jan. 31, 2001, No. 1, § 1, 2001 Ga. Laws 1, 1–2. 
 220. See, e.g., Dan Collins, Georgia Finally Unfurls New Flag, CBS NEWS (Apr. 4, 2003, 3:57 
PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/georgia-finally-unfurls-new-flag/ [http://perma.cc/2AWQ-GW7D] 
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compromise that gave rise to the monument protection language in this statute 
was short-lived.221 Two years after the 2001 amendments that both added 
monument protection language and reworked the state flag to minimize 
Confederate design aspects, a 2003 bill changed the state flag design back to a 
design based on the Confederate national flag.222 
In addition, the 2001 legislation that created Georgia’s general statue 
statute also included a section that specifically singled out Stone Mountain,223 a 
massive state-owned Confederate memorial and Ku Klux Klan rally site often 
referred to as the Confederate Mount Rushmore.224 The Stone Mountain 
protection statute provides, notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, 
that “the memorial to the heroes of the Confederate States of America graven 
upon the face” of the mountain “shall be preserved and protected for all time as 
a tribute to the bravery and heroism of the citizens of this state who suffered and 
died in their cause.”225 
In its current form, the general Georgia statue statute protects all “publicly 
owned monument[s], plaque[s], marker[s], or memorial[s]” that are associated 
with the military service of anyone associated with the United States of America, 
the Confederate States of America, Georgia, or any other state, whether part of 
the Confederacy or the Union.226 Such protected monuments may not be 
“relocated, removed, concealed, obscured, or altered in any fashion,” save for 
“appropriate measures” connected with “preservation, protection, and 
interpretation.”227 The statute also provides that any person or entity who 
“mutilate[s], deface[s], defile[s], or abuse[s] contemptuously any publicly owned 
monument, plaque, marker, or memorial” has committed a misdemeanor.228 
Similarly, the statute prohibits any state or local government agency, or any 
state or local government official, from “remov[ing] or conceal[ing]” any such 
monument “for the purpose of preventing the visible display of the same,” again 
subject to prosecution for a misdemeanor.229 In addition, the statute protects 
privately owned and protected monuments against any person or entity acting 
without authority who takes any of the long list of prohibited actions listed 
 
(noting that the state flag created in 2001 “was a compromise intended to shrink the Confederate 
emblem but incorporate the symbol in a mini-montage of old Georgia flags”). 
 221. See id. 
 222. Act of May 8, 2003, No. 4, 2003 Ga. Laws 26 (codified as amended at GA. CODE ANN. § 50-
3-1). 
 223. GA. CODE ANN. § 50-3-1(c) (West 2018). 
 224. See, e.g., Planned MLK Tribute on “Confederate Mount Rushmore” Stirs Controversy, CBS 
NEWS (Oct. 23, 2015, 7:09 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/martin-luther-king-jr-tribute-georgia-
stone-mountain-controversy-confederate-memorial/ [http://perma.cc/3VXB-FBGA]. 
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 226. Id. § 50-3-1(b)(1). 
 227. Id. § 50-3-1(b)(2). 
 228. Id. § 50-3-1(b)(1). 
 229. Id. 
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elsewhere in the statute.230 Furthermore, the statute provides that any person or 
entity aggrieved by any unauthorized damage, denigration, or relocation of a 
protected privately owned monument may bring damages against the person or 
entity, acting without authorization, who tampered with that monument.231 
As with the Tennessee and Alabama statue statutes, the Georgia statute’s 
protections are limited to those monuments that are “publicly owned.”232 This 
means that local governments in Georgia that wish to remove or alter 
Confederate monuments in public civic places may be able to do so if they first 
convey the property on which the monument stands to a sympathetic private 
actor. Beyond the public property carve-out, the provisions of Georgia’s statute 
that allow local governments to take “appropriate measures” connected with the 
“interpretation” of a protected monument233 should allow some local 
governments to minimize some of the longstanding negative impacts of 
Confederate monuments in public civic spaces. More specifically, this 
“interpretation” carve-out should allow local governments to erect plaques and 
other monuments or provide interpretative tools to demonstrate that 
communities now reject the messages that accompanied the monuments when 
they were first erected. 
E. North Carolina’s Statue Statute 
North Carolina’s statue statute, enacted in 2015, is another example from 
the recent crop of statutes often referred to as Heritage Protection Acts.234 The 
North Carolina statute applies to “object[s] of remembrance located on public 
property,” and it broadly defines “object[s] of remembrance” as any 
“monument, memorial, plaque, statue, marker, or display of a permanent 
character that commemorates an event, a person, or military service that is part 
of North Carolina’s history.”235 While the North Carolina statute does not single 
out the Confederacy or Confederate monuments, and there is no predecessor 
statute that does so, the timing of the statute’s passage suggests that it was 
motivated primarily by a concern for Confederate monuments, as other scholars 
have previously noted.236 
 
 230. Id. § 50-3-1(b)(4). 
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 234. Cultural History Artifact Management and Patriotism Act of 2015, Sess. Law 2015-170, 
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Under North Carolina’s statue statute, protected “object[s] of 
remembrance” may not be permanently removed.237 Protected monuments may 
be “relocated” on a temporary or permanent basis, but such a relocation is 
subject to a number of restrictions.238 First, temporarily relocated objects of 
remembrance must be returned to their original site within ninety days.239 
Second, permanently relocated objects of remembrance must be relocated to 
sites of “similar prominence, honor, visibility, availability, and access that are 
within the boundaries of the jurisdiction from which [they were] relocated.”240 
More specifically, objects of remembrance may not be permanently relocated to 
museums, cemeteries, or mausoleums unless they were originally located at such 
a site.241 
Despite the apparent breadth of the North Carolina statute and the 
specificity of the restrictions it imposes on relocating protected monuments, 
substantial opportunities exist for local governments in North Carolina that wish 
to alter or remove Confederate monuments. North Carolina’s statue statute, 
much like the statutes in Tennessee and some other states, only protects 
monuments on public property.242 As a result, if an otherwise-covered 
monument ever ceases to be on public property, it would presumably no longer 
be protected by the statute. In other words, in North Carolina, as in other states, 
a local government that wants to get rid of a Confederate monument might be 
able to do so, provided that it first conveys the property on which the monument 
stands to a friendly private actor. 
F. Mississippi’s Statue Statute 
Mississippi’s statue statute dates to 2004.243 It purports to protect “statues, 
monuments, memorials[,] or nameplates” that “have been erected on public 
property of the state or any of its political subdivisions” and that relate to 
historic military figures, events, organizations, or units from a number of past 
conflicts.244 In addition to statues, monuments, memorials, nameplates, and 
plaques, the statute covers almost any object that could be named after military 
 
 237. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 100-2.1(b). 
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figures, events, or organizations from the covered conflicts—everything from 
schools, streets, parks, bridges, and buildings would fall within the statute’s ambit 
if so named.245 
Under Mississippi’s statue statute, all protected monuments, public 
property, or public areas may not be “relocated, removed, disturbed, altered, 
renamed[,] or rededicated,” period.246 Moreover, “[n]o person may prevent the 
public body responsible for maintaining” a protected monument “from taking 
proper measures and exercising proper means” to preserve, protect, care, repair, 
or restore the monument.247 Unlike the statue statutes in some other states, there 
is no state commission for waiver of either of these restrictions nor is there a 
particular provision for revisiting the protection of the statute by the state 
legislature for specific monuments. Instead, the Mississippi statute expressly 
provides that the “governing body” responsible for the monument—which 
conceivably could be either the state or local government agency that directly 
maintains the monument, or the state or local government agency that maintains 
the property on which the monument is located if the monument is owned by a 
group like the United Daughters of the Confederacy—may determine that an 
alternative “location is more appropriate to displaying the monument” and “may 
move the memorial” to that alternative and “more suitable location.”248 In other 
words, the facial language of the Mississippi statute is more flexible than that of 
other statue statutes. 
This immediately apparent gap in the protections ostensibly afforded to 
qualifying monuments makes the Mississippi statue statute potentially one of the 
weakest, despite the apparent breadth of the statute’s protections. If local 
governments may simply choose to move protected monuments to a location 
that they deem “more suitable,”249 then although the statute may save such 
monuments from destruction, it does nothing to prevent local governments from 
moving such monuments to less prominent locations, or to locations where they 
can be placed in historical context and used as tools for education or 
reconciliation rather than as monuments to discrimination and intimidation. 
Underscoring the relative freedom that Mississippi local governments enjoy to 
move protected monuments, Mississippi’s attorney general recently weighed in 
on this specific statutory provision, writing that monuments can be moved within 
a county or municipality250 and that such a decision is a discretionary one that 
can only be made by the relevant local government.251 
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In addition to this gap in the statute’s ostensible protection, there are no 
penalties for violating any of its provisions. Although the state legislature has 
attempted to amend the statute and include penalties on multiple occasions, 
none of these attempts has succeeded to date.252 
G. Kentucky’s Statue Statute 
Kentucky’s statue statute,253 which was invoked during litigation over the 
Louisville-Brandenburg monument discussed in the introduction,254 dates to 
2002.255 Like the Mississippi statute, the text of the Kentucky statute imposes 
relatively weak restrictions on local governments, especially given the 
interpretation of the Kentucky statute by the relevant state regulations. 
Moreover, the Kentucky statute has proved relatively weak in practice, as local 
governments in both Louisville and Lexington have been able to move 
prominent and controversial Confederate monuments more easily than local 
governments in other states.256 
Kentucky’s statue statute forbids the alteration, destruction, removal, or 
transfer “of a site designated as a military heritage site” without either the 
written approval of the Kentucky Military Heritage Commission (Kentucky 
Commission or Commission)257 or the Commission’s rescission of the 
designation of the monument as a covered site.258 Military activities “engaged in 
by the Confederate States of America” are expressly included in the statute’s 
long list of what qualifies as “[m]ilitary heritage” under the statute.259 However, 
military heritage sites that meet the statute’s qualifications must be approved by 
the Kentucky Commission. In other words, without the Commission’s approval, 
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even if a monument might be eligible for protection under the statute, it is not 
protected by the statute. Violation of the statute is punishable as a misdemeanor 
for the first offense and a felony for each subsequent offense.260 
One key opportunity for local action under Kentucky’s statue statute relates 
to its unique registration process. More specifically, the statute only protects 
monuments approved as significant military heritage sites and designated as 
protected monuments by the Kentucky Commission.261 But very few of the 
monuments in the state that might qualify as protected military heritage sites 
have been through this application and registration process. Fewer than thirty of 
the more than two hundred sites or objects that might qualify, including many of 
the state’s most prominently displayed Confederate monuments, have ever been 
submitted to the Commission for consideration.262 Indeed, it was just such a 
failure to designate the Louisville monument considered in this Article’s 
Introduction that undercut the Kentucky Sons of Confederate Veterans’ attempt 
to prevent its removal.263 As Kentucky’s attorney general recently suggested, the 
Kentucky Commission has designated few monuments for protection because 
the application process for monument designation is quite complicated.264 
H. South Carolina’s Statue Statute 
Like many other statue statutes, the monument protection portions of the 
South Carolina Code do not single out the Confederacy.265 Unlike many other 
state statue statutes, the South Carolina statute has been invoked by those who 
wish to preserve memorials to conflicts besides the Civil War,266 but only to 
protect the alteration of racially segregated memorials to other conflicts besides 
the Civil War.267 This tends to underscore rather than undermine the links 
between South Carolina’s statue statute, the monuments it protects, and the 
state’s history of institutionalized discrimination. 
Moreover, as in other states, the centrality of Confederate monuments to 
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the statute is revealed by its history. More specifically, South Carolina’s statue 
statute was passed in 2000268 as part of a legislative compromise that removed 
the Confederate battle flag from atop the state capitol building while providing 
for its retention elsewhere on the capitol grounds.269 Accordingly, like the other 
statue statutes that were passed as parts of bills related to the display of the 
Confederate flag or the incorporation of Confederate imagery in state flag 
designs, the legislative history of the South Carolina statute strongly suggests 
that the bill was passed with the protection of Confederate monuments 
particularly in mind.270 Moreover, as in the other states examined here, the 
overwhelming majority of conflicts over protected monuments in South Carolina 
have been over Confederate monuments.271 
As noted above, the South Carolina statute covers “monuments or 
memorials,” terms not otherwise defined, and it covers many conflicts and 
periods of history in addition to the Civil War and the Confederacy.272 Under the 
statute, monuments or memorials related to covered conflicts or periods in 
history “erected on public property of the State or any of its political 
subdivisions” may not be “relocated, removed, disturbed, or altered.”273 
Similarly, no one may interfere with any “public body responsible for the 
monument or memorial” by preventing it “from taking proper measures and 
exercising proper means” (also undefined) for the “protection, preservation, and 
care” of protected monuments.274 
South Carolina’s attorney general has interpreted the term “public body” in 
the statute to include nonprofit groups such as the United Daughters of 
Confederacy and the Sons of Confederate Veterans.275 If this interpretation is 
adopted by South Carolina courts, then it might mean that private groups’ 
maintenance of protected monuments would be immune from interference from 
both local governments and potentially state agencies, which might wish to alter 
or remove the monuments. Such an interpretation would make South Carolina’s 
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statute more restrictive than other states for local governments that wish to alter 
or remove Confederate monuments. 
Unlike some other statutes, the South Carolina statute does not create or 
contemplate a state commission to hear petitions for waivers. Rather, the only 
possibility for waiver or modification of the monument protections is by a 
subsequent two-thirds vote of the state legislature.276 This makes South 
Carolina’s statute substantially more restrictive than other states, especially 
when one considers the pronounced rural-urban split in support for Confederate 
monuments.277 Convincing two-thirds of the state legislators in South Carolina to 
agree to modify a monument that is not in their district, and which therefore 
faces no relevant local opposition, would likely prove far more difficult than 
convincing a majority or even two-thirds of a bipartisan historical commission to 
grant a waiver.278 Again, this aspect of South Carolina’s statute makes it more 
restrictive than other states for local governments that wish to alter or remove 
Confederate monuments. 
Although the waiver process set forth by South Carolina’s statue statute is 
even more onerous than the waiver process in other states, there is some 
language in South Carolina’s statute that could be construed as protecting only 
those monuments that either themselves are “public property” or are located on 
“public property.”279 As with several other statutes, this language might be 
interpreted to mean that local governments in South Carolina that wish to move 
or alter Confederate monuments in public civic places might be able to do so, as 
s’s Novel Strategy for Tearing Down Confederate Statues, Atlantic (Dec a 
actor. 
On the other hand, the relevant language from the South Carolina statute 
refers to all monuments “erected on public property.”280 In contrast to the 
language in other states’ statutes, this language could be interpreted as providing 
more protection to Confederate monuments than analogous language from other 
statue statutes that only protect monuments that are publicly owned or located 
on public property.281 More specifically, unlike the language of many other 
statue statutes, the relevant language from the South Carolina statute might be 
interpreted as protecting all monuments that were originally erected on public 
property, even if they subsequently became private property or were moved to 
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private property.282 Such an interpretation of South Carolina’s statute would, of 
course, minimize the “public property” opportunity to alter or remove 
Confederate monuments that is or has been available to local governments 
under the Alabama, Georgia, North Carolina, and Tennessee statutes.283 
South Carolina’s statute also provides fewer opportunities than other 
statutes for local governments to modify or remove at least some Confederate 
monuments based on their age. For example, unlike Virginia’s statute, South 
Carolina’s statute has not been modified since it was passed in 2000, which 
means that the sort of temporal gap in protection created by Virginia’s oft-
modified statute does not exist in South Carolina. Nor was South Carolina’s 
statute drafted with the sorts of temporal categories seen in other states, which 
provide local governments with the opportunity to alter or remove some 
monuments based on the monuments’ ages.284 
In other words, South Carolina’s statue statute may be one of the most 
restrictive and least vulnerable examples of its kind—at least to the sorts of 
arguments discussed in Section II of this Article. Least vulnerable does not, 
however, mean invulnerable. Recall that South Carolina’s statue statute was 
passed as part of a response to controversies over the Confederate battle flag 
and Confederate monuments at and around the state capitol grounds.285 Indeed, 
most of the provisions of this 2000 legislation apply to specific Confederate 
monuments or Confederate flags in or around the South Carolina state capitol, 
unlike South Carolina’s general-purpose statue statute. For example, section 1 of 
the 2000 legislation refers to the flags authorized to be flown or hung atop the 
dome of the state capitol and in the state legislature’s chambers, while sections 5 
and 6 deal with the permanent display in the South Carolina State Museum of 
the Confederate flags that previously flew or hung in these locations.286 As a 
result, the legislation as enacted created new statutory sections across different 
chapters and even different titles of the South Carolina Code.287 
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these opportunities for local governments under Alabama’s statue statute. 
 285. See supra notes 268–270 and accompanying text for a discussion of the events leading to 
the passage of this legislation. 
 286. Act of May 23, 2000, No. 292, §§ 1, 5–6, 2000 S.C. Acts 2069, 2070, 2072 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of S.C. CODE ANN.). 
 287. Most of the statute was codified in title 10, which deals with public buildings and property. 
South Carolina’s statue statute, created by section 3 of the 2000 legislation, can be found in chapter 1 
of title 10 of the South Carolina Code. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1-165. But the 2000 Act placed some of 
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Some of the pieces of the 2000 legislation do refer expressly to penalties. 
For example, the legislation provides that anyone who “wilfully and maliciously” 
defaces, vandalizes, damages, destroys, or attempts the same to any monument 
or flag “located on the capitol grounds” shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.288 But 
this provision of the 2000 legislation does not reach monuments located 
elsewhere throughout the state. Moreover, as noted above, it is codified in a 
different chapter of the South Carolina Code than the statue statute. 
By contrast, the statue statute provisions that apply generally across the 
state contain no reference to any penalty.289 Nor is there any general provision 
for penalties in title 10, chapter 1 of the South Carolina Code—the title and 
chapter in which the statue statute is located—although other provisions of 
chapter 1 do contain specific penalties for their violation, including those 
sections that deal with recovering the costs of removal and storage for 
unauthorized parking in state-owned facilities.290 In other words, like the 
Mississippi statute and part of the Alabama statute, it is unclear what penalty 
attaches to a violation of South Carolina’s statute, and the most appropriate 
answer, given the statute’s structure, might well be no penalty at all. In sum, 
there are at least some opportunities to challenge the South Carolina statute in 
its current form, and the absence of clearly defined penalties should give those 
local governments inclined to do something about public Confederate 
monuments some encouragement to do so. 
* * * 
Contrary to the prevailing wisdom, statue statutes are not impossible 
barriers for local governments to overcome. Rather, each statute provides at 
least some opportunity for local governments to address the monumental legacy 
of institutionalized racism and violence in their public spaces, although some 
statutes provide more opportunities to local governments than others. Exploiting 
these opportunities is not the optimal solution—it would be better for 
legislatures or courts to get rid of these statutes altogether—but so long as the 
statutes remain in something like their current forms, local governments that 
wish to challenge them should not be discouraged from doing so by the statutes’ 
unearned reputation. 
III. BEYOND REPAIR: WHY COURTS AND LEGISLATURES SHOULD REJECT 
ATTEMPTS TO REVISE STATUE STATUTES THAT WOULD TAKE AWAY 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACTION 
Reviewing the history and terms of the statue statutes reveals that they are 
 
the provisions dealing with flags and monuments on or around the state capitol grounds in chapter 11 
of title 10 of the South Carolina Code, while others are located in title 1 of the South Carolina Code, 
which deals with the administration of the state government. Act of May 23, 2000. 
 288. Act of May 23, 2000, § 8 (emphasis added) (citing penalties provided in S.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 10-11-360). 
 289. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1-165. 
 290. E.g., id. § 10-1-200(3). 
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deeply flawed—primarily in terms of their purpose in attempting to protect 
monuments that enshrine entrenched patterns of discrimination, but also in 
terms of their practical effect. Many local governments subject to these statutes 
should have opportunities to alter or remove existing Confederate monuments. 
But it would be optimistic to assume that merely identifying opportunities for 
local government action under the statutes in their current form will signify the 
end of protected monuments without further conflict. 
For example, although some state attorneys general have acted to limit the 
interpretation or application of existing statue statutes,291 others have provided 
and will continue to provide guidance urging the broadest possible interpretation 
of the statutes.292 If adopted by courts, these broad interpretations of the statutes 
will minimize the opportunities for monument modification or removal available 
to local governments. Moreover, some officials or private individuals with 
standing under the relevant statutes who wish to protect the continued existence 
or present location of monuments covered by statue statutes can be expected to 
file administrative appeals or to litigate.293 They also may argue that some of the 
coverage gaps identified above should be minimized or read out of the statute 
altogether.294 Indeed, this has already begun to occur.295 
In other states, defenders of statue statutes may use legislation, rather than 
litigation, to patch the coverage gaps identified in this Article and provide more 
effective protection for Confederate monuments on public property. Such 
legislative fixes can be expected to take one of two forms.  
First, some state legislators who wish to preserve Confederate monuments 
and rehabilitate existing statue statutes may try to close off some of the 
opportunities for local action that exist in the current statutes while preserving 
much of the current statutes’ form and structure. As the Tennessee legislature’s 
response to the removal of Confederate monuments shows, this also has already 
begun to occur296—after all, a history of frequent legislative patchwork is one of 
 
 291. See, e.g., Va. Attorney General, Opinion Letter No. 17-032 (Aug. 25, 2017), 2017 WL 
3901711, at *3 (noting some of the time and location limitations on Virginia’s statue statute outlined in 
this Article); see also Eads et al., supra note 256 (noting that the Kentucky attorney general’s opinion 
relevant to the Lexington monuments, Opinion Letter No. 17-023, 2017 WL 4843705 (Oct. 17, 2017), 
“opened the door for the city to begin removal of the statues”). 
 292. See, e.g., Miss. Attorney General, Opinion Letter No. 2017-00275 (Oct. 2, 2017), 2017 WL 
5558441, at *2–3 (concluding that the ambiguity between the Mississippi statute’s monument removal 
and monument protection provisions should be resolved by allowing local governments to remove or 
relocate monuments only within their own jurisdiction). 
 293. See, e.g., Hartley & Ley, supra note 115 (noting that the Charlottesville monument dispute 
is likely to wind up in the Virginia Supreme Court). 
 294. See, e.g., Poe, Forrest Family, supra note 119 (noting that multiple chapters of the Sons of 
Confederate Veterans and other groups have already filed a lawsuit as well as a petition with the 
Tennessee Historical Commission challenging Memphis’s December 2017 sale of public property with 
Confederate monuments and the subsequent removal of those monuments). 
 295. See, e.g., Gladney, supra note 116 (discussing details of the suit filed by the State of 
Alabama against the City of Birmingham after Birmingham’s decision to cover Confederate 
monuments, which are more than forty years old, with plywood barriers). 
 296. See supra notes 185–186 and accompanying text. 
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the common characteristics in the history of many of the older statue 
statutes297—and these efforts will likely accelerate if local governments take 
greater advantage of the opportunities identified in this Article.298  
Second, some state legislators who wish to preserve Confederate 
monuments by statute might radically revise the existing statue statutes, seeking 
new justifications or new criteria for protecting monuments even if local 
governments wish to alter or be rid of them. Given the many opportunities for 
local action under several of the current statutes, such wide-ranging revisions 
might well strengthen the protections available to Confederate monuments in 
public spaces, even if the revisions involve apparent concessions to local control 
or sentiment against monuments.  
Third, state legislatures may take additional punitive action against cities 
that successfully remove or alter Confederate monuments. Here too, the recent 
experience of the Memphis monuments is instructive—recall that in addition to 
modifying the Tennessee statue statute, the state legislature also cut funding for 
the city’s upcoming bicentennial after the city removed Confederate monuments 
while complying with the existing statute.299 Such legislative retaliation against 
local government action is, of course, a much broader trend that is not confined 
to disputes over Confederate monuments.300 
Revisions of the statue statutes’ current flaws may pose substantial future 
challenges for local governments that wish to alter or remove Confederate 
monuments, and the specter of subsequent retaliation may deter local 
governments from acting to remove monuments under the letter of existing 
statue statutes. But the most significant potential problem facing local 
governments that wish to exploit the opportunities for action identified in 
Section II does not depend on any alteration to the existing statutes. Instead, it 
arises from the nature of the relationship between state and local governments. 
This relationship is one of profound inequality: Cities are constitutionally and 
legislatively subordinate to their states, making them vulnerable to action by 
state governments.301 Traditionally, local governments have been understood as 
mere “agent[s],” “creature[s],” and “delegate[s]” of the state,302 and in times of 
conflict between local and state governments, the supremacy of state over local 
authority often has been defined in particularly extravagant terms.303 This means 
 
 297. For example, as noted in Section II, Virginia’s statue statute has been amended at least ten 
times in its century-plus existence. See supra notes 132–140. 
 298. See, for example, supra notes 158–159 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 
unsuccessful attempts by Virginia legislators to fix the temporal gap in Virginia’s statue statute’s 
coverage. 
 299. See supra notes 183–184 and accompanying text. 
 300. See, e.g., Richard C. Schragger, The Attack on American Cities, ACSBLOG (June 14, 2018), 
http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/the-attack-on-american-cities [http://perma.cc/S8K7-63JZ] (noting that 
Tennessee’s retaliation against Memphis is just one example of a larger trend of “[l]egislative 
retaliation against progressive cities”). 
 301. See Schragger, When White Supremacists Invade, supra note 41, at 60–61. 
 302. Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7 (1990). 
 303. E.g., Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1062 n.9 (1980) 
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that intrastate preemption—the notion that a city’s authority in a particular area 
has been supplanted by state law—looms large in the background of any 
litigation about what local governments might do in the face of state law 
limitations. 
As Section II shows, the statue statutes are badly drafted, even if one 
accepts their underlying purpose as legitimate: if put to the test in their current 
form, many may fail to provide the protections they purport to provide. Indeed, 
some of the statutes have already failed this test.304 Setting aside the troubling 
intent behind the statue statutes, one might hope that their sloppy execution 
would deter courts from the sort of aggressive judicial intervention that will 
probably be required to patch some of the gaps in coverage identified in Section 
II of this Article.  
Unfortunately, courts in recent years have been increasingly willing to 
entertain sweeping preemption arguments related to many other types of badly 
drafted state legislation that has little in common with the statue statutes besides 
a high degree of hostility to local control and often to specific local 
governments.305 This phenomenon is twofold: state legislatures increasingly pass 
legislation that strips away or dramatically limits local government control, and 
state courts increasingly indulge these legislatures through an expansive 
approach to intrastate preemption.306 
The specter of intrastate preemption is not unique to Confederate 
monuments or statue statutes.307 Indeed, litigation involving intrastate 
preemption has grown increasingly common in recent years, especially in states 
with a sharp political divide between liberal urban centers and conservative rural 
expanses. In recent years, many states have seen their legislative and executive 
branches pass under the same party’s control,308 even as local governments have 
sought out new ways to regulate personal and economic conduct, including 
smoking bans, antidiscrimination ordinances,309 public broadband services, and 
minimum wage codes.310 More generally, the nation’s growing rural-urban divide 
 
(discussing “the leading case” concerning “state control over city powers and city property,” Hunter v. 
City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907)). 
 304. See, for example, supra note 256 and accompanying text for examples of situations where 
the Kentucky statue statute failed to protect prominent monuments in Louisville and Lexington. 
 305. See, e.g., Schragger, American Cities, supra note 33, at 1165–66 (noting several recent 
hostile legislative actions taken by states toward cities and local governments). 
 306. See, e.g., Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1114 (2007) (noting that 
“intrastate preemption” has become “the primary threat” to “cities’ ability to innovate”). 
 307. See, e.g., David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255, 2366 (2003) 
(suggesting that intrastate preemption will remain a “problematic shadow” until states amend their 
statutes or constitutions to “instruct courts to construe narrowly the scope of state preemption of local 
actions”); Paul S. Weiland, Federal and State Preemption of Environmental Law: A Critical Analysis, 
24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 237, 268–70 (2000) (concluding that both express and implied preemption 
are invoked to foreclose and invalidate local environmental controls). 
 308. NICOLE DUPUIS ET AL., NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, CITY RIGHTS IN AN ERA OF 
PREEMPTION: A STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS 1–5 (2017). 
 309. Diller, supra note 306, at 1114–15. 
 310. DUPUIS ET AL., supra note 308, at 6–7, 17–19. 
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continually raises the question of when local governments should be able to 
make their own decisions while creating clashes in which local governments are 
barred from taking actions important to local residents.311 
In particular, intrastate preemption conflicts have grown particularly heated 
in many of the southern states with statue statutes examined in this Article.312 In 
some of these states, local governments are particularly weak because they are 
among a relatively small number of jurisdictions that continue to adhere to 
Dillon’s Rule,313 an approach to local government distinct from the increased 
autonomy of the home rule approach.314 Under Dillon’s Rule, any exercise of 
local government power must “trace[] back to a specific legislative grant.”315 But 
the longstanding affinity of many courts in southern states, including those with 
statue statutes, for interpreting local authority narrowly and applying intrastate 
preemption broadly is noteworthy in both Dillon’s Rule and home rule 
jurisdictions.316 
All of this means that the threat of intrastate preemption in the context of 
state statue statutes is not merely a theoretical or hypothetical concern for local 
governments. Although there has been little litigation related to the 
opportunities for local action identified in Section II of this Article, preemption 
has already emerged as a central issue in conflicts over local attempts to exploit 
these opportunities. For example, in the litigation between the City of 
Birmingham and the State of Alabama over the city’s Confederate monuments, 
Alabama has suggested that the state statue statute’s preemption of local control 
over Confederate monuments is akin to the state’s licensure of barbers and 
mortgage brokers, or the taxation of aviation fuel.317 
As noted above, intrastate preemption doctrine is far from uniform. When 
state courts have construed and attempted to formalize the role and authority 
that local governments enjoy, they have done so in a variety of ways. Among 
other factors, different state legal cultures and idiosyncratic relationships 
between individual cities and their larger states mean that each state has its own 
 
 311. Graham, supra note 45; see also Schragger, American Cities, supra note 33, at 1164–65, 
1184–1216 (arguing that the recent “explosion of preemptive legislation challenging and overriding” 
local controls is attributable, in part, to a deep-seated anti-urbanism inherent in American federalism). 
 312. See, e.g., Graham, supra note 45 (“Like many recent [intrastate] preemption laws passed in 
states across the country, but especially in Southern states . . . , [the state statue statutes] pit 
conservative state legislatures against cities that tend to be more liberal and more diverse.”). 
 313. City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids & Mo. River R.R. Co., 24 Iowa 455 (1868) (Dillon, J.). 
 314. Diller, supra note 306, at 1124–27 (discussing the emergence of the home rule approach). 
 315. Schragger, When White Supremacists Invade, supra note 41, at 62–63 (citing City of Clinton, 
24 Iowa at 475). 
 316. E.g., Frayda Bluestein, Is North Carolina a Dillon’s Rule State?, COATES’ CANONS: N.C. 
LOC. GOV’T L., UNC SCH. OF GOV’T (Oct. 24, 2012), http://canons.sog.unc.edu/is-north-carolina-a-
dillons-rule-state [http://perma.cc/SFZ7-276F]. For example, North Carolina courts no longer apply 
Dillon’s Rule consistently, but neither is North Carolina a home rule state. Id. Nevertheless, North 
Carolina courts today frequently apply preemption rules that are at least “as strict, or perhaps even 
more strict” with respect to local governments’ authority than under Dillon’s Rule. Id. 
 317. Complaint at 2, State v. City of Birmingham, No. 01-CV-2017-903426.00 (Ala. Cir. Ct. filed 
Aug. 16, 2017) (motion to dismiss denied Oct. 16, 2017). 
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legal framework for preemption.318 Moreover, even within individual 
jurisdictions, courts have often applied state-specific preemption doctrines 
inconsistently.319 And thus, the chief issue, if and when states argue that statue 
statutes should preclude local governments from making the kinds of arguments 
outlined in Section II of this Article, will likely be how broadly to construe the 
withdrawals and limitations found in these statutes.320 If the express language of 
the statute is ambiguous or shoddily drafted—and the latter, at least, is true of 
many statue statutes—then courts may turn to the following question: Should the 
restrictions on local action in the state statutes be interpreted so broadly as to 
preempt even those local government actions that the statute’s structure or text 
clearly seems to permit? 
At first glance, this might not seem to be much of a problem for local 
governments, provided that whatever actions they take to modify or remove 
Confederate monuments are consistent with the relevant statue statute’s express 
terms or structure. But preemption arguments have been and may continue to be 
deployed by some state governments and private litigants seeking to protect 
Confederate monuments even when local governments take great pains to 
remove or modify monuments in ways that fit within the statue statutes’ express 
language and scope along the lines identified in Section II of this Article.321 More 
specifically, some state governments can be expected to push back in litigation 
 
 318. E.g., Uma Outka, Intrastate Preemption in the Shifting Energy Sector, 86 U. COLO. L. REV. 
927, 942–47 (2015). 
 319. Diller, supra note 306, at 1115–16 (noting that in preemption inquiries, “courts too often 
rely on unhelpful judicial tests” that are applied inconsistently, creating a confusing shadow over local 
authority). 
 Bearing in mind these caveats, the relevant framework for preemption arguments in the context 
of statue statutes is express preemption—the sort of preemption that occurs when a federal statute 
explicitly withdraws or limits specified powers from states, or when a state statute explicitly withdraws 
or limits powers from local governments. Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 226–28 
(2000) (defining express preemption). Preemption in the context of statue statutes is likely to be 
express rather than implied because the statue statutes expressly withdraw and limit local authority 
over protected monuments. This has been true for over a century, dating back to the early 
formulations of Virginia’s statue statute, which prohibited local governments (and all other persons) 
from interfering with or disturbing protected monuments. See supra notes 126–130 and accompanying 
text. 
 320. See Hannah J. Wiseman, Disaggregating Preemption in Energy Law, 40 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 293, 299 (2016) (noting that express preemption “requires courts to consider the scope of such 
preemption”); see also Nelson, supra note 319, at 226–27 (noting that in express preemption cases, 
judges must first “decide what the [preempting] clause means”). 
 321. The actions taken by Birmingham, and the pains that the city took to remain within the 
express language of Alabama’s statue statute, offer an instructive example. See Erin Edgemon, AG 
Files Lawsuit Against Birmingham over Confederate Monument, AL.COM (Aug. 17, 2017), 
http://www.al.com/news/birmingham/index.ssf/2017/08/ag_files_lawsuit_against_birmi.html [http://
perma.cc/ST5J-73JU] (noting Birmingham’s efforts to comply with the express language and structure 
of Alabama’s statue statute). Indeed, shortly before the lawsuit, even Alabama’s governor noted that 
it was at best “unclear if the statute” applied to the monuments in dispute. Erin Edgemon, Group 
Threatens To Sue Birmingham Again over Possible Confederate Monument Removal, AL.COM (Aug. 
16, 2017), http://www.al.com/news/birmingham/index.ssf/2017/08/group_threatens_to_sue_
birming.html [http://perma.cc/EW4V-FNU7]. Yet Alabama sued Birmingham the very next day, 
invoking intrastate preemption. See Complaint, supra note 317. 
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against local actions taken along the lines advanced in Section II, arguing for the 
broadest possible interpretation of statue statutes to prohibit local actions that 
are arguably inconsistent with the statutes’ muddled spirits even if they comply 
with the statutes’ actual terms.322 
The central idea behind this argument, which has been and will be aimed at 
local governments that seek to exploit opportunities to alter or remove 
monuments under the statue statutes as currently drafted, is straightforward 
enough. However poorly drafted an individual statue statute might be, it was 
clearly intended to curtail local authority over Confederate monuments. 
Accordingly, if local officials seek to exert authority over Confederate 
monuments contrary to the will of some state officials, then those actions should 
be preempted as contrary to the statute’s intent, even if the text of the statute 
clearly seems to permit the local government’s actions.323 On this view, almost 
any attempt by a local government to comply with the terms of statue statutes 
while modifying or removing monuments within their jurisdiction can be 
characterized as a scheme or a sham, which violates the spirit of the statute and 
should be overturned.324 Whatever one’s views may be on the merits of 
Confederate monuments in public places or the statue statutes that purport to 
protect them, there are good reasons to reject the expansive view of preemption 
outlined above—which is already emerging in the early litigation against local 
governments that have attempted to modify or move Confederate monuments. 
In other contexts involving express preemption claims, courts often find that 
the relevant state or federal statute indicates a clear intent to preempt local or 
state action only in a portion of the potentially covered regulatory area. As 
noted above, the scope of the alleged preemption is the key inquiry in such 
express preemption cases.325 But the preemption arguments emerging against 
local governments acting under the letter of the statue statutes preclude any 
inquiry into the scope of the alleged express preemption. Instead, they threaten a 
preemption unlimited in scope because it is untethered to the text of the statutes 
at issue. An example of intrastate preemption in another context may illustrate 
 
 322. E.g., Complaint, supra note 317, at 4 (arguing that Birmingham’s actions were inconsistent 
with both the “letter and spirit” of the Alabama state statute); see also David A. Graham, Memphis’s 
Novel Strategy for Tearing Down Confederate Statues, ATLANTIC (Dec. 21, 2017), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/12/memphis-confederate-statues/548990/ [http://
perma.cc/5WZK-SDK8] (arguing that Memphis’s strategy for removing monuments, along the same 
lines suggested in Section II of this Article, “raise[d] . . . uncomfortable questions” because it was 
“designed to follow the letter of the [statue statute] while brazenly flouting its spirit”). 
 323. See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 317, at 2–3 (arguing that plywood coverings violate the law 
prohibiting monuments from being “relocated, removed, altered, renamed, or otherwise disturbed”). 
 324. See, e.g., Poe, Forrest Family, supra note 119 (quoting from the Sons of Confederate 
Veterans’ petition to the Tennessee Historical Commission after Memphis’s removal of certain 
statues); see also City of Memphis v. Walter Law, APD No. 04.47-148176J (Tenn. Historical Comm’n 
Jan. 8, 2018) (reviewing arguments but denying the petition as moot). A request for review of the 
Walter Law decision was denied. Tennessee Heritage Protection Act, TENN. DEP’T ENV’T & 
CONSERVATION, http://www.tn.gov/environment/about-tdec/tennessee-historical-commission/redirect-
--tennessee-historical-commission/tennessee-heritage-protection-act.html [http://perma.cc/4NV5-
7XT5] (last visited Nov. 1, 2018). 
 325. Wiseman, supra note 320, at 299. 
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this point. Recent conflicts over local controls on hydraulic fracturing for oil and 
gas illustrate the problems with using preemption to paper over coverage gaps in 
statutes. The conflict over the extent of intrastate preemption over local fracking 
controls is a useful example because both fracking and statue statutes involve 
local governments’ attempts to exercise control over land use and the built 
environment—an area where local governments have traditionally enjoyed 
broad discretion.326 
Combined with advances in directional drilling, fracking has enabled 
tremendous growth in the production of U.S. natural gas, even as concerns about 
the side effects of fracking on the natural and human environments have led 
hundreds of local governments to try to limit fracking activity or even ban 
fracking outright.327 This, in turn, has led to litigation regarding the alleged 
preemption of these local limitations by state law, with varying outcomes across 
different jurisdictions.328 For example, many courts have been hesitant to 
conclude that statutes preempting local control in a particular regulatory area 
have preempted all relevant local controls without express language indicating 
such a broad scope.329 Accordingly, courts have frequently allowed substantial 
local restrictions on fracking activity to remain in place, including some outright 
bans.330 
Perhaps more importantly, some continued local control over fracking 
activity has been tolerated even in states that have relatively restrictive 
approaches to local government authority, where courts have struck down local 
fracking bans on preemption grounds.331 Even in such jurisdictions, when courts 
conclude that local control over fracking has been preempted, they often do so in 
limited terms, thereby preserving the possibility for limited future local action.332 
For example, local governments in these jurisdictions can amend their zoning 
 
 326. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON ET AL., LAND USE CONTROLS 45 (4th ed. 2013) (“Public land 
use regulation in the United States traditionally has been mainly the province of local governments.”). 
 327. Outka, supra note 318, at 928–35. 
 328. Id. at 975 (“[L]ocal governments’ legal authority over fracking remains in flux, remains a 
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 330. E.g., Wallach, 16 N.E.3d at 1203. 
 331. See, e.g., Ne. Nat. Energy, LLC v. City of Morgantown, No. 11-C-411, 2011 WL 3584376 
(W. Va. Cir. Ct. Aug. 12, 2011). 
 332. See, e.g., id. (holding that the city’s “complete ban on fracking” was preempted by the 
state’s expressly preemptive statutory scheme, while noting that the “legal issue in [the] case is very 
narrow”). 
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ordinances to prohibit some drilling and other fracking activity near schools, 
hospitals, houses of worship, and residential neighborhoods.333 Such room for 
local control over land use and the built environment remains even in the face of 
statutory language that is far clearer, more comprehensive in its scope, and thus 
a better platform for preemption arguments than the statue statutes examined in 
this Article. 
The space that remains for local governments to regulate fracking activity, 
even when local bans have been preempted, suggests that at least some local 
actions taken under the opportunities outlined in Section II of this Article will 
survive the preemption gauntlet. Stripping away a local government’s authority 
to regulate the use of land and the built environment is a far different thing than 
taking away its ability to set a minimum wage or expand medical leave. The 
latter strikes at local governments’ ability to innovate,334 but the former strikes at 
the heart of what local governments traditionally do.335 At the most basic level, 
the statue statutes are fundamentally about the control of land, which has 
traditionally been at the heart of local governments’ control. Indeed, many of the 
monuments in question either are the property of local governments or are built 
on property that belongs to local governments. In such cases, what the statue 
statutes seek to control is not merely local governments’ ability to control private 
property but also local governments’ ability to control their own property.336 
Nevertheless, the boundaries of intrastate preemption doctrine have 
expanded in unpredictable ways in recent years, which means that courts in 
some—perhaps many—jurisdictions may conclude that the relevant statue 
statutes preempt opportunities for local action against Confederate monuments. 
Moreover, even if preemption does not rear its unpredictable head against the 
opportunities for local action contemplated in Section II, it is possible that state 
legislatures in some jurisdictions will revise the statue statutes to try to close off 
some of these opportunities. But neither possibility should deter local 
governments from challenging the statue statutes and making use of the 
opportunities discussed in this Article. In fact, challenging the statue statutes 
along the lines suggested in Section II might be the best way to enhance the 
constitutional arguments against the statutes reviewed in Part I.B, which would 
clear out the statue statutes root and branch altogether. 
At this point, it is worth remembering how the statue statutes hide their 
practical flaws and constitutional vulnerabilities behind their structural 
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complexity,337 their sweeping references to the military history of the United 
States, and their frequent discussion of monuments to veterans of other 
conflicts.338 It takes a substantial amount of time and energy to scrub away the 
veneer, revealing the gaps in the statue statutes’ coverage, their special solicitude 
for monuments to the Confederacy, and the fraught history of Confederate 
monuments in public spaces. A series of coordinated and thoughtful challenges 
to the statue statutes using the opportunities outlined in Section II of this 
Article, whether or not the challenges are ultimately successful, has the potential 
to inform the public of these flaws in a more direct way, thereby changing 
perceptions and attitudes toward Confederate monuments in public places.339 
In addition, a coordinated series of challenges making use of the 
opportunities identified in this Article may throw the constitutional infirmities of 
the statue statutes into stark relief. Recall that even some of the authors of the 
constitutional arguments against statue statutes have expressed uncertainty 
about the likely success of those arguments against the statutes as currently 
drafted,340 in part because Confederate monuments still enjoy widespread public 
support.341 But if state legislatures revise or state courts construe the existing 
statue statutes in ways that foreclose any opportunity for local control over 
Confederate monuments in public spaces, then this support may shift. 
When statue statutes and the monuments they protect are justified 
primarily by gauzy references to a selectively remembered past, it may be 
difficult to appreciate the harms they have imposed on those who have long 
faced institutionalized discrimination. But forcing a defense of statue statutes on 
preemption grounds, even if the underlying challenge is unsuccessful, may help 
reframe the debate. An expansive approach to preemption in this context reveals 
that a fight over statue statutes and the monuments they protect is not really 
about how we remember some distant Lost Cause, but instead about how we 
exercise power and control over our built environment in the present. 
Accordingly, local governments in states with statue statutes that wish to alter or 
remove Confederate monuments have much to gain by exploiting the 
weaknesses of the statue statutes identified in this Article. If such local 
governments succeed in the short term—and there are many reasons to think 
they might—then they will expose the many flaws of the statue statutes while 
altering or removing at least some Confederate monuments. But even if their 
efforts are thwarted on preemption grounds, local governments that challenge 
statue statutes may help us all to understand what is really at stake when we 
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consider Confederate monuments in public spaces. 
CONCLUSION 
Memory, especially the shared memory that public monuments help to 
build, is a tricky thing. We may hope that our individual memories were given to 
us “for some wise purpose,” and we may wish to build our shared memory wisely 
as well—to use it, perhaps, as a “mirror in which we may discern the dim outlines 
of the future,” so that we may make that future more tolerant and just.342 But the 
shared memory that we construct together can also distort what came before, 
obscuring what was truly brave and virtuous and casting a false light on the 
errors and evils of the past.343 By seeking to preserve Confederate monuments in 
places of public honor, the statue statutes represent just such a misuse of shared 
memory. These statutes reinforce a one-sided monumental vision of history that 
has supported recurring patterns of institutionalized racism and violence, and 
they restrict the ability of local governments to redress these historical wrongs 
and present the past in a more honest and accurate light. 
To date, the statue statutes have escaped widespread challenges, in part 
because the statutes have been described as nearly invulnerable fortresses that 
local governments cannot hope to penetrate. This conventional wisdom about 
statue statutes is incorrect. Local governments have more freedom to alter or 
remove Confederate monuments in public places under existing statue statutes 
than many have thought and reported. They should be encouraged to challenge 
the statue statutes by pursuing opportunities that recur across different versions 
of the statutes as well as avenues for local action that are unique to individual 
statutes. When asked to resolve these challenges, courts should not bar these 
opportunities for local action by adopting overly aggressive interpretations of 
intrastate preemption doctrine. Nor should state legislatures seek to close off 
these opportunities for local action by attempting to repair the fundamentally 
flawed statue statutes. Finally, when local governments seek to act against the 
statue statutes, they should do so in coordinated fashion, framing their 
challenges to highlight the statutes’ constitutional vulnerability and working to 
hasten the day when these statutes can be swept away altogether. 
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